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“Τhis constitution of the working class into a political party is indispensable in order to 
ensure the triumph of the social revolution and its ultimate end — the abolition of classes” 
Resolution of the London Conference on Working Class Political Action 
as adopted by the London Conference of the International, September, 1871 
 
“The question of power cannot be evaded or brushed aside  
because it is the key question determining everything in a revolution’s development 
and in its foreign and domestic policies.” 
V.I. Lenin, “One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution” 
 
“In short, without the form of the Party, the movement remains caught in the vicious 
cycle of “resistance”, one of the big catchwords of “postmodern” politics, which likes to 
oppose “good” resistance to power to a “bad” revolutionary takeover of power. 
The key “Leninist” lesson today is: politics without the organisational form of the Party is 
politics without politics, so the answer to those who want just the (quite adequately 
named) “New Social Movements” is the same as the Jacobins’ answer to the Girondin 
compromisers: “You want revolution without a revolution!” 
Slavoj Žižek, Revolution at the Gates, Žižek on Lenin, The 1917 Writings 
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Introduction 
Without doubt, the collapse of the regimes of “really existing socialism”, at a 
period when the politics and ideology of neoliberalism had already prevailed on a 
global scale, caused many to feel defeated and disappointed. On the other hand, 
one must admit that the “fall of Rome” revealed the need to elaborate a theory 
of communism as a true movement under new conditions and urged us to go 
deep down to the root of the problem and search for a contemporary theory of 
revolution.  
The, more or less forgotten, words of young Marx were once again 
dramatically inscribed in our memory: “To be radical is to grasp the root of the 
matter. But for man the root is man himself”.1 And, in this sense, I believe 
Professor John Holloway can undoubtedly be considered a radical thinker. 
Against the grey backdrop of the collective denials and under the faint rays of 
light shed by the so-called ‘anti-globalisation movement’, Holloway digs into the 
soil of revolutionary theory and practice of the 20th-century communist 
movement so as to get to the root, man himself.  The purpose of this venture is 
none other than to cultivate the evergreen tree of revolution, so that it may, 
through new methods and practices, give fruit once again, other than the bitter 
fruit tasted by those who gave in to the charms of the dream of revolution in 
the relatively recent or far-off past.  
In the first place, Holloway's work is a token of positive response to the 
Marxian imperative of changing the world: “The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it".2  So, then, let’s 
change the world, Holloway agrees; however, according to his line of argument, a 
radical change of the world, a change towards the communist direction, implies 
not taking power.  
                                               
1 See  Marx Karl, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in Marx-Engels, Werke, 
vol..1., p.385 408 [English translation available at  
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm 
2 11th Thesis on Feuerbach  : “Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber darauf an, 
sie zu verändern.“ Note the syntactic absense of the subject in the second semi-sentence, where Marx mentions not the 
interpretation, but the change of the world.  
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In what follows, I will approach this line of argument with a critical eye, 
moving upon three different but intertwining tracks - epistemological, 
ontological and sociopolitical. In any case, I reject the cold and value-free 
posture towards Holloway’s theorem. Besides, I do not believe that access to 
the truth is guaranteed in terms of a cognitive-theoretical purity. On this, let 
me recall Slavoj Žižek’s bold formulation:  
"Lenin’s premise –which, today, in our era of postmodern relativism, 
is more pertinent than ever-- is that universal truth and 
partisanship, the gesture of taking sides, are not only not mutually 
exclusive, but condition each other: the universal truth of a 
concrete situation can be articulated only from a thoroughly 
partisan position; truth is, by definition, one-sided."3 
Indeed, militancy opens the way towards the truth. But not any kind of 
militancy. From my own militant point of view, the open Marxism of the author 
of the much-discussed Change the World Without Taking Power, which bears 
the characteristic subtitle The Meaning of Revolution Today,4 will be 
confronted critically through the deployment of the wealth of a Marxist 
tradition that he chose to dismantle and reject, in parts, as mainly responsible 
for the bankruptcy of the communist revolutions of the 20th century.  
 
                                               
3 Slavoj Žižek, “Afterword: Lenin’s choice”, as included in Revolution at the Gates, A selection of Writings from February to 
October 1917. V.I.Lenin, (edited and with an Introduction and Afterword by Slavoj Žižek), Verso, London and New York, 
p.177. 
4 The book was first published in English in 2002 by “Pluto Press”, while the Greek edition was published by "Savvalas" 
in 2006, transl. Anna Holloway. 
 5 
 
I. The paradigm of "open Marxism": an epistemological introduction to 
Holloway's theory on “the meaning of revolution today" 
 
To fully understand Holloway's perception of science, in general, and of 
Marxism as a theory of revolution, more specifically, one must consider the 
indissoluble connection between the theorist's views and the epistemological 
and philosophical paradigm which at the beginning of the 1990s came to be 
known as "open Marxism".  
 
In 1992, approximately ten years before the publication of Change the World 
Without Taking Power, the first two volumes of the three-volume work Open 
Marxism were published. It was a collective work, edited by Werner Bonefeld, 
Richard Gunn and Kosmas Psychopedis, including, amongst others, articles by 
Antonio Negri and John Holloway, who was co-editor of the third volume, 
published in 1995.5 
So, let us observe how the theoretical undertaking of open Marxism is 
approached by its own proponents in the introduction to the first volume of 
their scientific brainchild:  
“Almost all 1980s Marxism counts as ‘closed' Marxism in this, 
scientistic and positivistic, sense. […] Hence, the timeliness of 
supplying an alternative reference-point: open Marxism. ‘Openness’, 
here, refers not just to a programme of empirical research –which 
can elide all too conveniently with positivism—but to the openness 
of Marxist categories themselves. This openness appears in, for 
instance, a dialectic of subject and object, of form and content, of 
theory and practice, of the constitution and reconstitution of 
categories in and through the development, always crisis-ridden, of 
a social world. Crisis refers to contradiction and to contradiction's 
                                               
5 Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.), Open Marxism, Pluto Press, London 1992, vol. I, II. 
Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, John Holloway and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.), Open Marxism, Pluto Press, London 
1995, vol. III 
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movement: this movement underpins, and undermines, the fixity of 
structuralist and teleological-determinist Marxism alike. Rather 
than coming forward simply as a theory of domination --
'domination’ reporting something inert, as it were a heavy fixed 
and given weight—open Marxism offers to conceptualise the 
contradictions internal to domination itself. Crisis, understood as a 
category of contradiction, entails not just danger but opportunity. 
Within theory, crisis enunciates itself as critique”.6 
In this context, as its proponents themselves claim, open Marxism emerges in 
opposition to a closed Marxism, a Marxism which either accepts the theoretical 
horizons of the given world as if they were its own, or gives in to a teleological or  
causalist determinism.7 The closed character of such an epistemological and 
generally philosophical pattern is recognised in that it approaches social 
relations, as well as conceptual categories themselves, qua things; therefore, 
the object of open Marxist criticism par excellence is so-called fetishism.8 
According to the theoretical representatives of the open Marxism, fetishism, 
insofar as it is the expression of the reification of social relations, i.e. an 
inverted form of relations between people as relations between things, 
transforms Marxism from a programme/process of critique into a closed and 
fossilised ideological system.  
In short, “openness” is proposed and applied mostly as a synonym of 
critique,9 while the “closed character” refers mainly to fetishism, which was 
targeted by the rich theoretical tradition of radical thinkers such as 
Luxemburg, the young Lukács, Korsch, Bloch, Pashukanis, Adorno, and other 
more or less renowned intellectuals mentioned by the proponents of open 
Marxism. 10 
 
                                               
6 Ibid., vol. I (Dialectics and History), p.xi 
7 Ibid., p.xii 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p.xiii 
10 Ibid.., p.xii 
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Through such a lens, the theorists of open Marxism refuse to approach 
the social act as a simple observation of the "unfolding of structural or 
deterministic ‘laws’".11 In this sense, the opening up of the categories 
themselves imposes not the pinning down of categories as things in the “solid 
ground” of a system of social structures, but their dynamic evolution as 
theoretical resonances of social processes in the “quicksand” of class struggle, 
where, according to the theorists of open Marxism, "instead of the theoretical 
certainty of a Marxism of dogmatic closure, open Marxism reclaims the 
incompleteness of the process of thinking and readopts […] the unpredictability 
of the movement of class struggle”.12 
In this sense, the open character of the categories is organically linked to 
the fluidity which derives from the "antagonistic nature of social existence" 
itself, a fluidity which is caused, in the final analysis, by class struggle and its 
own character, equally open as regards its outcome.  
 
However, it is not only through the critique of fetishism that the paradigm of 
open Marxism is constructed and supported. Using the classic Marxist posture 
on the unity of theory and practice as a point of reference, the proponents of 
open Marxism note that:  
"Open Marxism urges both the opening of concepts on to practice, 
whose capacity for renewal and innovation always surprises us, and 
the mediating of that practice through categories of a critical and 
self-critical kind. Thereby, [open Marxism] transcends the 
dichotomy: theory or practice. The notion that theory and practice 
form a unity is as old as Marxism itself; however, traditional 
schools of Marxism […] have tended to see the theorists as 
standing outside of society and as reflecting, externally, upon it. 
Within such conceptual frameworks, the unity of theory and 
                                               
11 Ibid., vol. II (Theory and Practice),  p. .xi 
12 Ibid.,p.xii 
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practice can amount only to the application of theory to practice. 
Structuralism and voluntarism are dichotomous, though conjoint, 
outcomes of such an approach. Structuralism and voluntarism are 
complementary inasmuch as they are the result of the separation 
between allegedly abstract laws and subjectivity. Open Marxism 
moves beyond such a dichotomy by acknowledging theory to obtain 
in and of practice and by acknowledging practice (that is, human or 
social practice) to occur only in some reflectively considered, or 
unreflectively assumed, set of terms. Theory can be no less 
concrete than practice, and practice can be no less abstract than 
theory. We do not have two movements dualistically counterposed 
but a single theoretico-practical class movement which, to be sure, 
contains differences and diversity within itself.13 
On the other hand, however, it becomes obvious that the theorists of open 
Marxism try to upgrade, in an epistemological but also generally philosophical 
way, the concept of relation over that of structure. They essentially reject the 
notion of capital itself as structure --which imposes limits on the theory and 
practice of the active subject—and, instead, favour the approach of capital as a 
relation amidst which class struggle, ever-open as to its outcome, occurs: 
“understanding capital as a social relation implies that there are no inescapable 
lines of development. Alleged ‘lines of development’ are the fetishised forms of 
the capital-labour relation itself, i.e. of class struggle".14 
It is in the context of this antagonistic relation between capital and 
labour that, according to this same line of argument, capital continuously tends 
to ensure its reproduction, inscribing and subjecting the other pole of the 
relationship, i.e. labour, to its own conditions. Capital is approached by open 
Marxism both as a relation within which class antagonism takes place, but also 
as a subject, i.e. an active pole of a relationship whose opposite pole is labour.  
                                               
13 Ibid.,pp.xiii-xiv 
14 Ibid.,p.xii 
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More specifically, it must be underlined that the representatives of open 
Marxism, following at this point the line drawn in the 1960s by the operaista 
(autonomist/workerist) Mario Tronti,15 consider this relation between capital 
and labour to be defined by an asymmetry definitely crucial for Communist 
revolutionary theory: “capital depends upon labour, for its valorisation, but 
labour for its part in no way depends, necessarily, on capital's rule".16 
This argument by Tronti is brought up again in the context of open 
Marxism by Werner Bonefeld, who points out that “capital cannot autonomise 
itself from living labour; the only autonomisation possible is on labour’s side. 
Capital’s domination is a process of its own self-contradictory mode of 
existence.”17 At the same time, capital, insofar as it prevails in its antagonistic 
relation to labour, imposes upon the latter, albeit temporarily, the form which is 
needed in order to satisfy its own (capital’s) needs. This agrees with the 
philosophical approach which sees forms not as static recipients of a certain 
content, but as antagonistic and asymmetric processes.18 
In this context, class struggle, as the mode of existence of classes and, 
therefore, as a process of their constitution and reconstitution between and 
amidst antagonism, emerges as a logical and historical 
determinant/precondition of class structures.   
“I want to show”, Bonefeld insists, “that ‘structures’ are modes of 
existence of the class antagonism of capital and labour. The ‘laws 
of capitalist development’ are an abstraction in action, a historical 
reality, a process and a movement of the presence of labour within 
capital. […] The notion of the primacy of class antagonism 
effectively says that structures do not exist. Of course in a sense 
                                               
15 I refer to the article by Mario Tronti “Lenin in England”, first published in Classe Operaia in January 1964 and also 
referred to by John Holloway in Change the World Without Taking Power.  
16 Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.), ibid., vol. II (Theory and Practice), p.xiii. 
17 Werner Bonefeld, “Social Constitution and the Form of the Capitalist State”, Open Marxism, ibid., vol.I (Dialectics and 
History), p. 103 
18 As Werner Bonefeld notes, ibid. p.105, “form is seen here as the modus vivendi of antagonistic relations". 
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they do exist, but they exist only as modes of existence of class 
antagonism and hence as social process, and not only as social 
process but as historical results of the working of class antagonism 
and hence as historical premises for class struggle. As such, 
structures exist as things qua reification of human relations". 19 
 
To sum up: through the epistemological/philosophical prism of open Marxism, 
the fetishist forms used to perceive social relations call for a comprehension 
using their open character as a starting point. What is actually needed is the re-
interpretation of those static and lifeless forms as life-giving processes, class 
struggle itself being the most eminent amongst them, at least according to 
Marxism. In these terms, alienation, for example, is not considered the outcome 
of a static structure based on the private ownership of the means of 
production, but the contrary: private ownership itself is perceived as the 
outcome of a process through which living labour becomes alienated and 
exists.20 
Thus, we conclude in the drawing of a crucial 
epistemological/methodological path:  
 
At a moment when the fetishism of capital and commodity, this religion of 
capitalism, thrusts us towards a perception of the world as a system of 
structures and things, open Marxism reminds us of the Marxian critique: 
we must open up anything that appears as a thing, i.e. statically, and 
approach it as a relation, as an open process, i.e. in the dynamics of its 
contradictory movement.  
 
Condensing the epistemological proposal of open Marxism in the words of 
Werner Bonefeld, we read:  
                                               
19 Ibid., p p.98, 114 
20 Werner Bonefeld, “Capital as Subject and the Existence of Labour”, in Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, John 
Holloway and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.), Open Marxism,  vol.III (Emancipating Marx), p.205 
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“Capital, however, is not a thing. Marx’s critical insight focuses on 
the question why human beings produce, through their own labour, 
a reality which increasingly enslaves them. This insight throws into 
relief the treatment of either capital or labour as things in 
themselves, or as two externally related subjects […] Capital is 
thus constituted as a living contradiction. Contradictions can not be 
defined, as if they were a world apart from human social practice. 
Rather, human social practice constitutes, suffuses and 
contradicts the perverted world of things”.21 
However, one could claim that, in a sense, the discourse of open Marxism 
regarding capital and its fetishism merely repeats Marx's own analysis. Indeed, 
the author of Grundrisse and Das Kapital approached and analyzed capital as a 
relation, he studied its genesis, accumulation and modes of transformations as 
processes that evolve through the relation of capital with living labour and its 
taming under the form of wage labour. It is Marx, par excellence, who refused 
to reduce capital and commodity to things or to a set of things, seeking, in each 
case, the social relation that defined their becoming and their being.  
I will not exhaust the argumentation on this, indeed crucial, issue. Instead, 
I will content myself with selecting and setting out certain samples of Marxian 
literature on this subject, as it evolved during the years that Marx occupied 
himself with the critique of political economy.  
So, let us begin with a characteristic fragment of Marx’s lecture at the 
German Working Men's Club in Brussels in 1847, which was published on April 
4th, 1849, under the title "Wage Labour and Capital" in the Neue Rheinische 
Zeitung: 
 
                                               
21Werner Bonefeld, “The Principle of Hope in Human Emancipation: On Holloway”, Herramienta, 
http://www.herramienta.com.ar 
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“A Negro is a Negro. Only under certain conditions does he 
become a slave. A cotton-spinning machine is a machine for spinning 
cotton. Only under certain conditions does it become capital. Torn 
away from these conditions, it is as little capital as gold is itself 
money, or sugar is the price of sugar. 
Capital also is a social relation of production. It is a bourgeois 
relation of production, a relation of production of bourgeois 
society. The means of subsistence, the instruments of labour, the 
raw materials, of which capital consists – have they not been 
produced and accumulated under given social conditions, within 
definite special relations? Are they not employed for new 
production, under given special conditions, within definite social 
relations? And does not just the definite social character stamp 
the products which serve for new production as capital?”22 
But also in the Grundrisse of the 1857-1858 period, Marx insists on analytical 
approaches23 or condensed formulations, such as the following:  
“Finally, the result of the process of production and realisation is, 
above all, the reproduction and new production of the relation of 
capital and labour itself, of capitalist and worker. This social 
relation, production relation, appears in fact as an even more 
important result of the process than its material results. And 
more particularly, within this process the worker produces himself 
as labour capacity, as well as the capital confronting him, while at 
the same time the capitalist produces himself as capital as well as 
the living labour capacity confronting him. Each reproduces itself, 
by reproducing its other, its negation. The capitalist produces 
                                               
22 Karl Marx, «Wage Labour and Capital", in Marx-Engels, Werke, Vol.6, pp.407,408 [English translation available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/wage-labour/ch05.htm  
23 On this, .see Karl Marx’s analysis in Notebook IV of Grundrisse, in  Marx-Engels, Werke, Vol.42, esp.363 ff.  
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labour as alien; labour produces the product as alien. The capitalist 
produces the worker, and the worker the capitalist etc.24 
A few years later, in his economic works of the 1861-1864 period, and especially 
in the draft of Chapter 6 of Capital, where he refers to the results of the 
immediate process of production, Karl Marx mentions: 
“Capital is no more a thing than money is. In capital, as in money, 
definite social relations of production between persons are 
expressed as the relations of things to persons, or definite social 
connections appear as social characteristics belonging naturally to 
things. As soon as the individuals confront each other as free 
persons, there is no production of surplus value without a wage 
system. Without the production of surplus value there is no 
capitalist production, hence no capital and no capitalist! Capital and 
wage labour […] merely express two factors in the same 
relation.”25  
It is, in essence, the same line of approach to the relation between capital and 
wage labour, but also to capital itself as a social relation, that is phrased in the 
most strict --epistemologically speaking-- way in the pages of Capital, with 
formulations such as this: 
"Capital, land labour! But capital is not a thing, it is a definite social 
relation of production pertaining to a particular historical social 
relation, which simply takes the form of a thing and gives this thing 
a specific social character. Capital is not the sum of the material 
and produced means of production. Capital is the means of 
                                               
24 Marx, Grundrisse, ibid., p.371 (english translation available at  
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch09.htm) c 
25 Karl Marx, “The Direct Production Process”, draft of Chapter 6 of Capital, in Marx-Engels, Collected Works, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, vol.34, p.355 ff. 
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production as transformed into capital, these being no more capital 
in themselves than gold and silver are money."26 
 
So, is there any doubt that it was Marx, long before the theorists of open 
Marxism, who systematically approached concepts and material realities, such 
as capital and money, as a condensation of social relations and corresponding 
social process? None whatsoever! By no means do we discover America by 
claiming, in the 1990s, that "for Marx the social individual in capitalism has no 
existence outside perverted forms”, that “capital has no logic independent of 
labour’s social practice”, or that “Marx’s theory of value is, foremost, a theory 
of ‘social constitution’”.27  
Neither does the programmatic affirmation that “Marxism is an 
emancipatory theory and, as such, must always criticize not only a perverted 
social existence but, and at the same time, the perversion of thought through 
which it [Marxism] itself exists”28 lay claim to a prize of originality. Let us 
remember that Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, for example, had already 
reached the same conclusion in the 1930s, when he wrote that “the philosophy 
of praxis is an expression of historical contradictions; it is, actually, the most 
complete expression, as it is the most conscious” 29 
So, where lies the sharp edge of the ambitious theoretical plan to 
emancipate not only Marxism, but Marx himself, that the representatives of 
open Marxism propose and defend? In their own words: 
“The first concern is the emancipation of Marx (and Marxism) 
from the sociological and economic heritage which has grown up 
around it under the banner of ‘scientific Marxism’ […] We regard 
                                               
26 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol.III, p.953.  
27 Werner Bonefeld, “Capital as Subject and the Existence of Labour”,in Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, John 
Holloway and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.), Open Marxism, ibid., vol.III (Emancipating Marx), pp.197-203. 
28 Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, John Holloway and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.), Open Marxism, ο.π., vol.III 
(Emancipating Marx), p.3 
29 Antonio Gramsci, Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1996, pp.118-119 
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(open) Marxism as the site of a self-reflection which clears the 
way towards a defetishised and emancipated social world. Only if 
we work to clear the massive deadweight of positivist and 
scientistic/economistic strata can Marxism emerge again as a 
constitutive moment in that project of emancipation which is its 
heartland and its home. […] The Open Marxism project does not 
aim to reconstruct Marx’s thought, in the sense of presenting an 
interpretation which masquerades as the sole "correct" one. Such 
an approach would not be helpful, for it would presuppose the 
possibility of a uniform and finished interpretation of Marx's 
work. Instead we wish to reconstruct the pertinent theses of his 
work with a view to freeing them from the ballast of their 
dogmatic presentation.”30 
 
At this point, all we have to do is closely observe the main lines of this plan to 
liberate Marx and Marxism from its positivist and economistic dependencies, a 
plan which the author of Change the World Without Taking Power, John 
Holloway, tries to materialize. Amongst the representatives of open Marxism, 
he is the one to try to organically link this specific theoretical model with the 
multifarious, so-called “anti-globalisation” social movements. 
 
II. The epistemological issue: Holloway’s argumentation as a critique of the 
tradition of “scientific Marxism" 
 
Holloway’s critique of “scientific Marxism” is, in essence, the process through 
which the author of Change the World Without Taking Power formulates his 
own proposals on science and knowledge, through the development and 
expansion of the epistemological points of open Marxism. In this sense, it is 
                                               
30 Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, John Holloway and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.), Open Marxism, ibid., 
vol.III(Emancipating Marx),  p.1 
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interesting to clarify from the beginning how the author himself places and 
defines his work in relation to the multidimensional Marxist tradition:  
“The most powerful current of negative thought is undoubtedly 
the Marxist tradition. However, the development of the Marxist 
tradition, both because of its particular history and because of the 
transformation of negative thought into a defining ‘-ism’, has 
created a framework that has often limited and obstructed the 
force of negativity. This book is therefore not a Marxist book in 
the sense of taking Marxism as a defining framework of reference 
[…] far less is it neo-Marxist or post-Marxist. The aim is rather to 
locate those issues that are often described as ‘Marxist’ in the 
problematic of negative thought, in the hope of giving body to 
negative thought and of sharpening the Marxist critique of 
capitalism."31  
Therefore, the category of negation-- or, to put it in other words that Holloway 
himself alternatively uses, the category of non-identity-- is rendered crucial. 
The evident influence of Adorno's negative dialectics on Holloway's thinking, 
mentioned at many occasions in the pages of his work,32 urges the author of 
Change the World Without Taking Power, to claim that “for Marx, science is 
negative. The truth of science is the negation of the untruth of false 
appearances. In the post-Marx Marxist tradition, however, the concept of 
science”, Holloway claims, “is turned from a negative into a positive concept”.33 
And for clarity's sake he explains that, contrary to what many 
erroneously claim, Engels is not the sole responsible for this "positivisation" of 
science and of Marxist theory. Certainly, the author claims, the pamphlet 
“Socialism: Utopian and Scientific” played a decisive role in the determination of 
                                               
31 John Holloway, Change the World Without Taking Power. The Meaning of Revolution Today. Pluto Press, London, 2002, 
pp.8-9  
32 In a characteristic reference to Adorno's negative dialectics, Holloway, ibid. p..74,  mentions:  “Over all our  reflections 
on identity stands the terrible warning of Adorno: ‘Auschwitz confirmed the philosopheme of pure identity as death’” 
33 Holloway ibid. p.118 
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the identity of “scientific Marxism”; it is also true that this tradition of 
“scientific Marxism” was developed through time by theorists such as Kautsky, 
Lenin, Luxemburg and Pannekoek. Nevertheless, still according to the author, 
the “positivisation” of Marxist theory “is far more deep-rooted than that would 
suggest. It certainly finds expression in some of Marx’s own writings (most 
famously the ‘1859 Preface’ to his Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy […].34  
 
One cannot help but be impressed by the broadness of the spectrum of 
theorists and works that contributed, according to Holloway, to the 
determination of a Marxist positivism or, more accurately, to the absorption of 
Marxist critique by the positivist version of science. Indeed, one is even more 
impressed when focusing on the content and characteristics that the author 
attributes, in an undifferentiated manner, to contrasting theoretical 
approaches, so as to construct the object of his critique, what he calls the 
"tradition of scientific Marxism". According to the author himself: “In the post-
Marx Marxist tradition the concept of science is turned from a negative into a 
positive concept”. It is, of course, the already mentioned tradition from which --
as open Marxism had foretold—Marx himself must be liberated, as he too gave 
in to the sirens of positivism and scienticism in certain aspects of his work!  
To be more specific, the line of argument of the author of Change the 
World Without Taking Power in relation to Marxism as a science evolves around 
the following axes, which must be specified before we can approach them with 
a critical eye:  
 
1. Claiming that, in Marx, science has a chiefly negative and in this sense critical 
character, he determines three cognitive-theoretical and ultimately political 
waves that urge Marxism towards positivism and scienticism. As we already 
noted, the first of these waves unfolds in the texts of Marx himself, the most 
                                               
34 Ibid., p. 119 
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characteristic being, according to Holloway, the 1859 Preface to the 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. The second and most powerful 
wave is constituted and developed through the dialectics of nature, as 
introduced by Engels, while the third one, under the strong Engelsian influence 
in the sphere of German Social Democracy, is embedded in the thought of its 
major representatives such as Kautsky and Luxemburg and, through them, 
reaches until Lenin. In the context of such an approach, this course towards 
positivism would undoubtedly find its completion in the form of the "scientific 
Marxism" of the Soviet text-books. It is precisely on the basis of such a 
consideration that Holloway concludes:   
“The collapse of the Soviet Union represents both a danger to 
Marxism and a liberation. The danger is that it will simply become a 
dead language, with fewer and fewer people reading Capital and 
being able to understand all the debates that presuppose a 
knowledge of Marx’s work. The liberation is that we are at last 
freed of the positivisation of Marxism that the Soviet tradition 
represented and able to sharpen Marxism as negative thought”.35 
2. The downgrading of the negative, i.e. critical, character of Marxian thought, 
as occurs especially in the sphere of "scientific Marxism", marks its mutation 
into a functionalist theory of society. According to Holloway, “the integration 
of Marxism into social science, far from giving it a secure home, actually 
undermines the basis of the categories which Marxists use. The understanding 
of Marxism as a theory of society gives rise to a particular type of social theory 
which can be described as functionalist".36 Functionalism as a characteristic of 
“scientific Marxism” consists, on the one hand, in that everything is now studied 
through the lens of the reproduction of the capitalist system and, on the other, 
in that the greater objective of changing the world is relegated to a more or 
less far-off future.  
                                               
35 Ibid., Ch.1, fn.12,  p. 216 
36 Ibid., p.136 
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To put it in Holloway’s words,  
“Functionalism, or the assumption that society should be 
understood in terms of its reproduction, inevitably imposes a 
closure upon thought. It imposes bounds upon the horizons within 
which society can be conceptualised. In Marxist functionalism, the 
possibility of a different type of society is not excluded, but it is 
relegated to a different sphere, to a future. Capitalism is a closed 
system until –until the great moment of revolutionary change 
comes”.37 
3. Treating Marxism as a science, in the spirit of what Holloway defines and 
denounces as "scientific Marxism", leads to an instrumental approach to 
knowledge itself. In this sense, all that is defined as knowledge or science is 
used as a tool in the hands of privileged owners in order to enlighten and, 
ultimately, subjugate those who have not yet been enlightened by scientific 
knowledge. Class struggle itself, according to Holloway, is treated by such a 
scientific paradigm not as a “process of self-emancipation”, but as an 
“instrument to achieve a preconceived end”. 38 
4. The belief that Marxist science can foresee, by itself and without the 
shadow of a doubt, the future of class struggle, of revolution and of the 
communist society that will result from a deterministically developing and 
socially materialised Logic of History, is yet another crucial point which, 
according to Holloway, characterizes the deviation of Marxist and Marxian 
critique towards a closed and dogmatic system of theses. In other words, in the 
cognitive and theoretical corpus of Marxism, the category of certainty prevails 
over those of contingency and indeterminacy, thus leading the process of 
critique to stagnation.  
As the author of Change the World Without Taking Power claims and 
monotonously repeats,  
                                               
37 Ibid., p.137 
38 Ibid., p.127 
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“In the tradition of scientific Marxism, criticism does not play a 
central role. Certainly there is criticism in the sense of 
denunciation of the evils of capitalism; but there is no criticism in 
the sense of the genetic criticism of identity. [..] The core of 
orthodox Marxism is the attempt to enlist certainty on our side. 
This attempt is fundamentally misconceived: certainty can only be 
on the other side, the side of domination. Our struggle is 
inherently and profoundly uncertain.”39 
5. Immediately related with the epistemological and philosophical-historical 
notion of certainty is, according to Holloway's analysis, the absorption of 
subjectivity in the profound field of objective reality. “Science, in the Engelsian 
tradition which became known as ‘Marxism’ is understood as the exclusion of 
subjectivity: ‘scientific’ is identified with ‘objective’”. 40 
 
In this sense, it is rendered obvious that Holloway blames the 'Engelsian 
tradition’ for the subjection of Marxian critique to the model of scientific 
positivism, a process that, according to the author, is mainly materialised 
through its dialectical  nature, as brought forward by Engels and developed not 
only through the work of the major representatives of the Second 
International, but even that of revolutionary Marxists such as Luxemburg, Lenin 
and Trotsky, who, while trying to resist positivism and economism, were not able 
to avoid objectivism, meaning subjugation of the subject to the object or, in 
other words, the subduing of process to structure: 
“Against the quietistic, wait-and-see interpretations of historic 
necessity favoured by the main body of the Second International, 
all the revolutionary theorists of the period (Luxemburg, Lenin, 
Trotsky, Pannekoek, and so on) stressed the need for active 
                                               
39 Ibid., p.138 
40 Ibid., p. 121 
 21 
 
revolutionary intervention. But this emphasis on the subjective was 
seen in all cases as complementary to (if not subordinate to) the 
objective movement of capitalism.” 41 
 
6. Ultimately, and in full consonance with the epistemological paradigm of what 
is known as “open Marxism”, Holloway detects the root of the dogmatism 
expressed by the tradition of "scientific Marxism" in the overlooking of the 
issue of fetishism: “a Marxism that is blind to the question of fetishism is 
inevitably a fetishised Marxism”.42 Fetishism corrodes the core of Marxian 
theory itself, tending to transform it from critical thought and science of denial 
and subversion into a fossilised system of theses for the interpretation of the 
capitalist world.  
 
And yet! Let me insist: this epistemology which defends the cause of changing 
the world without taking power is resisted not only by the work of Marx himself 
but also by that of Marxist thinkers, such as Lenin, Luxemburg and others, who 
Holloway indistinctively seeks to incorporate to what he defines as “the Marxist 
tradition after Marx” or “the tradition of scientific Marxism". To substantiate 
my own critique to Holloway’s argument --although the analysis of the Marxian 
and, by extension, the Marxist concept of science is surely an issue that 
exceeds the lines of this essay—I will point out just a few characteristic 
moments of the mentioned resistance, of what Marxism defines as science in 
opposition to the epistemological rhetoric of Holloway and his open Marxism.  
 
1. So, let us examine the validity of Holloway's main argument, that for Marx 
science is negative and tends to become positivised in the process through 
Marxian texts such as the ‘1859 Preface’ to the Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy.  
                                               
41 Ibid., p.124 
42 Ibid., p.138 
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Firstly, it must be stressed that it was Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
who, having already written the German Ideology and having come to rupture 
with idealistic metaphysics, pursued the constitution of the materialist 
conception of History on the basis of, or --better-- under the form of positive 
science:  
"Where speculation ends – in real life – there real, positive science 
begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the 
practical process of development of men. Empty talk about 
consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place. 
When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of 
knowledge loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can 
only be taken by a summing-up of the most general results, 
abstractions which arise from the observation of the historical 
development of men".43 
Undoubtedly, not only does positive science --as it is expressly defended from 
the very beginning by Marx and Engels-- not oppose mechanically the critique of 
past and present social reality, it is actually organically linked to critique itself. 
Critique based on the observation (Betrachtung) of true life is at the core of 
positive science, i.e. of the scientific knowledge of social formations, as it is 
reflected in their being as well as in their potential becoming. In this sense, the 
critique liberated by negation tends to adopt a positive content, a content of 
positive knowledge of the history of class societies. It is this observation from a 
specific viewpoint -- through the particular lens of the proletariat as a 
revolutionary class and, more specifically, as a class which negates the class 
constitution of society and, therefore, potentially its existence as a class— 
which allows the grounding and constitution of a critique of ideology as false 
                                               
43 Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, in Marx-Engels, Werke, Vol.3, p.27 [English translation available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm#5a4)  
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conscience, meaning the grounding of the materialist conception of History as a 
positive science.  
We are familiar today with the scientific form that Marx himself tried to 
attribute to the conclusions of the systematic observation of the practical 
activity of people, of the "truly active people”, as they produce and create in the 
context of the capitalist economy. Of course, we are talking about the critique 
of political economy which could, according to his own indications, be identified 
without doubt and inhibition with its synonym: a positive science of political 
economy. Without doubt and inhibition precisely because, for us, there is a 
distinct line that differentiates the Marxian and, why not, Marxist 
interpretation of science from its positivist version.  
In terms of the history of ideas and movements, the existence of such a 
dividing line is undeniable; however, it is not located where Holloway erroneously 
tries to draw it. It does not run through the lines of the “1859 Preface” and the 
texts of the “tradition of scientific Marxism” in a general, confused and hazy 
manner. As for the socialist movements of the 19th and 20th centuries and 
their ideas, the "positivisation" of Marxism, i.e. the eradication of the dividing 
line between Marxism and positivism, was pursued in a conscious and systematic 
way by the neo-Kantian "ethical socialists" of the Second International, such as 
Bernstein and Vorländer, and the so-called “orthodox Marxists” like Kautsky, in 
the beginning, and the theoretical proponents of Stalinist “Marxism” further 
on.44 
 
But let us examine the much discussed fragment from Karl Marx's "1859 
Preface", the starting point --always according to Holloway-- of the "infection" 
of Marxian theory by the virus of positivism.  
In a time of social revolution, Marx writes, we experience 
 
                                               
44 In this same line, see Lucien Goldmann,  "Is there a Marxist sociology", International Socialism, Autumn 1968, no..34, 
Chicago, pp.13-21.  
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“The material transformation of the economic conditions of 
production, which can be determined with the precision of natural 
science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in 
short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this 
conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by 
what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of 
transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this 
consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of 
material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces 
of production and the relations of production”.45 
The continuity of this Marxian excerpt in relation to the German Ideology is 
obvious. Positive --and not positivist-- science presupposes the Betrachtung, the 
precise observation of the subversions that are already taking place at a given 
moment in history, as it is only on the basis of this systematic observation that 
one can perceive the social dynamic itself. Marx does not prepare, as positivist 
Comte, "recipes for the cook-shops of the future", he does not prophesy 
revolutions; he rather observes and studies his own time, his own society, as it is 
already evolving, and he discerns tendencies. In this sense, the radical and all-
embracing subversion, as well as the society which will emerge through this 
process of subversion, are not judged on the basis of the arbitrariness of will 
and mind, but rather through their founding on positive facts.  
On this I shall insist: Marx's break with idealistic metaphysics does not 
lead him to adopt a "Social Physics".46 Contrary to what a positive epistemology 
would demand, the positive fact, according to Marx, is not identified with the 
empirical fact. The positive fact of Marxian science is not obvious, it is not 
exhausted at the level of experienced phenomena. Marxian positive science 
constitutes the very path from phenomena to essence, it is the negation or, 
                                               
45 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, inMarx-Engels, Werke, Vol.13, p.9 (English translaiton 
available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm)  
46 In the epilogue to the second German edition of Capital, Marx protests: “Thus the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me 
in that, on the one hand, I treat economics metaphysically, and on the other hand –imagine !—confine myself to the mere 
critical analysis of actual facts, instead of writing recipes (Comtist ones ?) for the cook-shops of the future.  
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even better, the interpretative transcendence, the interpretative Aufhebung 
of the phenomena and the revealing of their essence: “But all science would be 
superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly 
coincided”.47 
In this sense, one cannot but remind Professor Holloway of the distinction 
proposed by the anti-positivist Marx between the mystical version of dialectics, 
which had become a “German fashion” in mid-19th century, and its rational 
version, adopted and defended by the author of Das Kapital:  
“In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, 
because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state 
of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to 
bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in 
its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing 
state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the 
negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it 
regards every historically developed social form as in fluid 
movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature 
not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing 
impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.”48 
Neither is the subject of this process of transition from phenomenon to 
essence, the positive scientist, a socially neutral, detached observer of the 
social reality of which he/ she is part. The Marxian scientific point of view is not 
that of the allegedly value-free positivist conception of science. The positivist 
distinction between fact and value, which leads up to the schematic, neo-
Kantian fragmentation between Marxism as science and Marxism as ideology, 
is the very opposite of the conception of science as was constituted and studied 
                                               
47 Marx, Capital, ibid., Vol. 25, p.825 (English translation available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch48.htm)  
48 Karl Marx, Capital, ibid, Vol. 23, p..28 (English version available at  
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm)  
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by Marx in each separate phase and aspect of his work.49 Marx's scientific 
viewpoint is a militant viewpoint, dictated not by the apparent but by the 
essential reality of the working class as a revolutionary class. 50 
Besides, we must not ignore the fact that Marx as a revolutionary thinker 
of the proletariat had made his conception of militant science very clear from 
the beginning:  
“Just as the economists are the scientific representatives of the 
bourgeois class, so the Socialists and Communists are the 
theoreticians of the proletarian class. So long as the proletariat is 
not yet sufficiently developed to constitute itself as a class, and 
consequently so long as the struggle itself of the proletariat with 
the bourgeoisie has not yet assumed a political character, and the 
productive forces are not yet sufficiently developed in the bosom 
of the bourgeoisie itself to enable us to catch a glimpse of the 
material conditions necessary for the emancipation of the 
proletariat and for the formation of a new society, these 
theoreticians are merely utopians who, to meet the wants of the 
oppressed classes, improvise systems and go in search of a 
regenerating science. But in the measure that history moves 
forward, and with it the struggle of the proletariat assumes 
clearer outlines, they no longer need to seek science in their minds; 
they have only to take note of what is happening before their eyes 
and to become its mouthpiece. So long as they look for science and 
                                               
49 On this, see: 
- Lucio Colletti, “Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second International” in From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and 
Society. New Left Books, London 1974,. esp. pp.44-50 
-Lucien Goldmann,, "Is there a Marxist sociology?", available at 
http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj/1968/no034/goldmann.htm  
50 As Lucio Colletti smoothly notes in Marxism: Science or Revolution”, in From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and 
Society, ibid. p.236, “Marxism, therefore, is a science. It is an analytical reconstruction of the way in which the mechanism 
of capitalist production works. On the other hand, as well as being a science, Marxism is revolutionary ideology. It is the 
analysis of reality from the viewpoint of the working class. This in turn means that the working class cannot constitute 
itself as a class without taking possession of the scientific analysis of Capital. Without this it disintegrates into a myriad of 
"categories". The working class [...] is not a given factor, it is not a product of nature. It is a destination point: the product of 
historical action, i.e. not only of material conditions but also of political consciousness“. 
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merely make systems, so long as they are at the beginning of the 
struggle, they see in poverty nothing but poverty, without seeing in 
it the revolutionary, subversive side, which will overthrow the old 
society. From this moment, science, which is a product of the 
historical movement, has associated itself consciously with it, has 
ceased to be doctrinaire and has become revolutionary.”51 
Without doubt, the role and content of the revolutionary science that Marx 
refers to cannot consume itself in the negation of the existing order. In 
rejecting capitalist society, the critique of Communists as theorists of the 
proletarian class simultaneously points towards the tendencies to constitute a 
new society. In this sense, the revolutionary science proposed by Marxian 
discourse is historically grounded and radically distinct from positivist 
scienticism and utopian visions alike. The rejection of the existing order 
contributes to the abolition of the conditions that, until today, ensure the 
reproduction of the capitalist formation, simultaneously promoting and setting 
the preconditions for a new society.  
However, it is obvious that the dialectical notion of Aufhebung is not 
acceptable in the conceptual framework of Holloway's epistemology.52 Position 
and Negation are externally opposed, without the philosophic mediation of the 
dialectic of contradiction.53 To approach revolution, Holloway rejects science, 
                                               
51 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy. Collection «Les auters  classiques», Édition électronique, 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques,  p.83 [English translation available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02.htm#s7) 
52 Let us recall how Hegel himself defines the double meaning of aufheben: "We mean by it (1) to clear away, or annul: 
thus, we say, a law or a regulation is set aside; (2) to keep, or preserve: in which sense we use it when we say: something is 
well put by. This double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative meaning, is not an 
accident, and gives no ground for reproaching language as a cause of confusion. We should rather recognize in it the 
speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere ‘either-or’ understanding” (Logik, §96, Enzyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grudrisse [English edition included in references]) 
53Let us observe how Hegel himself defines contradiction, but also the relation between positive-negative: 
“Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable. The 
only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But contradiction, 
when cancelled, does not leave abstract identity' for that is itself only one side of the contrariety. The proximate result of 
opposition (when realised as contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as difference superseded and 
deposited to elements in the completer notion”. (Logik, §119, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grudrisse 
[English edition included in references]) 
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which he practically identifies with the positivist ideology. Nevertheless, the 
danger of Marxism being reduced to positivism cannot be avoided through the 
fetishism of negation. It cannot be avoided by mechanistically cutting off 
negative dialectics from positive science, as Holloway does. On the contrary, it is 
only through organically linking it with the dynamics of History as class struggle 
–and more specifically interweaving it with the struggle of the proletariat—that 
revolutionary science can arm itself against the danger of its positivist 
distortion.  
 
2. However, could it be that to study the modus operandi of the capitalist 
formation through the prism of its reproductive mechanisms does indeed lead 
to a reduction of Marxism to a functionalist social theory, as Holloway claims? 
Faced with the anti-dialectical approach to the relation between "reproduction 
and subversion ", which imbues and defines Holloway's analysis, we insist that 
the scientific understanding of how capitalism works, i.e. how it reproduces 
itself, is a conditio sine qua non for its overturning; only through this process can 
the conditions of consciousness be created so that people might perceive the 
struggling contradictions, the class contradictions, and move towards their 
abolition. Only through this process can they act in a revolutionary way.  
Once again we must resort to the neo-Kantian positivism of the Second 
International in order to point out the repercussions of schematically dividing 
the study of the conditions for the reproduction of capitalism from the study 
of the conditions for its overturning. An entire generation of renowned 
theorists of the German social democracy has tried to support the opinion that 
Marxism as a science is in no way related, or should at least not be confused, 
with the moral ideal of the socialist society.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
“The Positive is the aforesaid various (different) which is understood to be independent, and yet at the same time not to 
be unaffected by its relation to its other . The Negative is to be, no less independently, negative self-relating, self-subsistent, 
and yet at the same time as Negative must on every point have its self-relation, i.e. its Positive, only in the other. Both 
Positive and Negative are therefore explicit contradiction; both are potentially the same."(Logik, §120, Enzyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grudrisse[English edition included in references]) 
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As Karl Kautsky points out characteristically:  
“Even the Social Democracy as an organisation of the Proletariat in 
its class struggle cannot do without the moral ideal, the moral 
indignation against exploitation and class rule. But this ideal has 
nothing to find in scientific socialism, which is the scientific 
examination of the laws of the development and movement of the 
social organism, for the purpose of knowing the necessary 
tendencies and aims of the proletariat class struggle. 
Certainly in Socialism the student is always a fighter as well, and no 
man can artificially cut himself in two parts, of which the one has 
nothing to do with the other. Thus even with Marx occasionally in 
his scientific research there breaks through the influence of a 
moral ideal. But he always endeavours and rightly to banish it 
where he can. Because the moral ideal becomes a source of error 
in science, when it takes it on itself to point out to it its aims".54  
Holloway naturally condemns this epistemological and, ultimately, political logic, 
but in what way and to what effect? The fear of repeating the error of neo-
Kantian and “orthodox Marxist” theorists leads him to the anti-dialectical 
generalisation that to study capitalist society through the conditions of its 
reproduction is to inevitably limit the scope of this critique and, therefore, of 
subversive action.  
However, it is not the study of the reproductive mechanisms of capitalism 
that relegates the issue of communist society to a vague future, but failure to 
approach these mechanisms as processes defined through the struggle 
between contrasting forces, meaning dialectically. In this sense, it is rendered 
obvious that “Marxist functionalism”, as an expression of the “tradition of 
scientific Marxism” that Holloway opposes, is a “contradiction in terms”. 
                                               
54 Karl Kautsky, Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, in the collection Marxismus und Ethik, Texte zum 
neukantianischen Sozialismus, (Herausgegeben von Rafael de la Vega und Hans Jörg Sandkühler), Suhrkamp Verlag, 
Frankfurt am Main 1970, p..258. [English translation avaialable at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1906/ethics/ch05b.htm#s5d)  
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Revolutionary science, as defined by Marx and developed by certain Marxist 
theorists such as Lenin and Luxemburg, approaches the couple "reproduction-
subversion" in its dialectical unity. To activate the forces that will overturn the 
capitalist formation and to render them effective, we must study them 
epistemologically and establish them on the solid ground of positive facts, on 
the positive knowledge of the mechanisms of reproduction of this specific 
capitalist system. On the other hand, such a study can indeed turn into a 
functionalist social theory –and, therefore, become disconnected from the 
discourse and spirit of Marxism—if it does not systematically unfold and orient 
itself towards the radical questioning and overturning of the status quo.   
 
3. The way in which Holloway's open Marxism opposes science as a 
means/instrument for emancipation, a value in itself/an end in itself, leads to an 
anti-dialectical comprehension of the “science-revolution” couple and, ultimately, 
to a distorted understanding of the Marxian conception of knowledge and its 
bearers as external and oppressive factors for the movement and the 
revolution. For example, the fact that the Marxian critique of political economy 
operates as a means in the process of comprehending and, ultimately, subverting 
capitalism in a communist direction, does not single-handedly entail the formal 
instrumentality of knowledge and science in relation with the goal of revolution, 
as Holloway erroneously claims. Lenin, Luxemburg and Gramsci do not regard 
science, Marxism itself as science, as completed objects to be used by the 
proletariat in order to satisfy its needs.   
In this case too, the author of Change the World Without Taking Power 
generalizes dangerously in his conception of the "tradition of scientific 
Marxism". Through his epistemological approach, Holloway ascribes an 
instrumental conception of knowledge and science to the “tradition of 
scientific Marxism”, a characteristic which is mainly linked to neo-Kantian and 
“orthodox Marxism”. The external relation of science towards the labour 
movement and the corresponding power relation of the bearers of knowledge 
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over the working class are very different from the understanding that Marx 
himself –as well as important Marxist theorists—had of science and its relation 
with the proletariat and its movement.  
According to Marx and Engels, but also to other Marxist theorists that 
clash with the positivism and scienticism of the Second International, although 
revolutionary science is not immediately produced by the proletariat, its 
constitution presupposes the existence of the revolutionary class as well as the 
existence of a theoretical and political vanguard that is organically linked with 
the proletariat itself. Of course, I am not overlooking Holloway’s critique against 
the Kautskian thesis --a thesis repeated by Lenin in What is to be Done?-- 
regarding the introduction of revolutionary ideology to the labour class 
consciousness “from the outside", a deeply political issue which I will discuss 
further on. For the time being, I will merely repeat what those who accuse 
Lenin of an instrumental conception of knowledge and an oppressive approach 
towards the working class ignore with great ease: not in a distance, but only 
through an organic connection with the working class and its movements can 
the isolated bourgeois theorists and scientists, as well as the party as a 
collective organizer and thinker as Lenin or Gramsci conceived it, constitute and 
examine the theses of a revolutionary science and, ultimately, of the science of 
revolution itself.  
 
4. Also, Holloway's pinning of the epistemological and, indeed, philosophical-
historical sin of certainty upon the "Marxist tradition after Marx" unveils a 
strong tendency to smooth away important differences which are obvious even 
to the naked eye in the work of the theorists of Marxism. For the time being, I 
will only stress certain points that are related to the cognitive and theoretical 
status of certainty in the cognitive and theoretical corpus of Marxism.  
Firstly, a detailed reading of the “1859 Preface”, such a favorite target of 
critique, amongst many others, for the anti-positivist proponents of open 
Marxism, effortlessly leads us to the conclusion that Marx does indeed defend 
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the possibility to reach conclusions with "the precision of natural science". 
However, he particularly refers to the study of processes that have already 
taken place or, in any case, are in the course of realisation, in the exclusive field 
of economy and under the form of completed or ongoing developments and 
subversions caused by the clash between the social productive forces and the 
relations of production.  
In this sense, one could arguably claim that Marx's scientific analysis 
does not turn towards the future too, at least not with the same certainty that 
imbues its conclusions about the past and present of class societies and, more 
specifically, of capitalist society. Also, the scientific approach of certain 
domains of human activity, apart from that of the economy, is not 
characterised by the same degree of scientific precision in each separate field 
of research.  
There is no doubt that Marx was greatly captivated by the rapid progress 
of positive science and technology in his time, and that is reflected in his use of 
examples and terminology coming from the field of sciences such as biology and 
physics.55 However, he systematically insisted on the particularity of social 
sciences, resulting from the Marxian approach to society and nature as distinct 
poles of a dialectical unity of oppositions. This particularity is also expressed in 
Marx's social understanding of matter, as well as in his disagreement with the 
abstract or mechanistic materialism of philosophes such as Helvetius or 
d’Holbach, or with Feuerbach’s naturalistic materialism. It is exactly this 
particularity that makes the author of Capital speak of tendencies when 
studying the capitalist economy, despite his use of terms such as "natural" or 
"iron rules"; a clear example of this is the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, 
so important for the dynamics of the capitalist system.   
There is no doubt that Marxism cannot persist in its epistemological and 
generally cognitive conatus if disconnected from the determinist philosophical 
approach. Therefore, if a critical evaluation of Marxism, such as the one 
                                               
55 See, for example, characteristic formulations in the preface to the first (German) edition of Capital.  
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undertaken by Holloway, does not wish to give in to the destructive appeal of 
vagueness, it should at least search and evaluate the differences between the 
determinism proposed by the Marxism of Lenin or Gramsci, on the one hand, 
and the one expressed by the evolutionism and economism of the theorists of 
the Second International, on the other. In relation to this, let us remember the 
breakdown theory (Zusammenbruchstheorie) and the storm of discussion and 
analysis it caused amongst the theorists of the 19th and 20th-century labour 
movement; that will help us to grasp the simplifying and generalizing character 
of Holloway's assertion that the “Marxist tradition after Marx” in toto 
dismisses critique in favour of certainty.  
 
5. However, Holloway commits an equally grave epistemological faux-pas when 
he blames the multidimensional tradition of “scientific Marxism” for excluding 
the subject from its theoretical analysis. Holloway's own failure to perceive the 
relation between "structure and process"56 --and, ultimately, the relation 
between “object and subject”-- epistemologically as well as philosophically, in 
dialectical terms, leads him to approach Marxism as an epistemological version 
of objectivism.  
Once again, he hastily generalizes when he claims that subjectivity yields 
before the hard positivist discourse of "scientific Marxism” which, parting from 
Engels’s analysis, considers the subject as a mere consequence of the object. 
However, at this point, having obviously realised the extremely generalizing 
nature of his line of argument, he partly excludes theorists such as Luxemburg, 
Lenin, Trotsky and Pannekoek from this charge of objectivism. Indeed, 
Holloway cannot but acknowledge the presence of the subject in the analysis of 
the mentioned Marxist theorists, who decisively opposed the tradition of the 
Second International and its crude objectivism; however, he does “discover” --
and, therefore, criticize—that, in their work also, the subject is reduced to a 
complementary role, a “stooge” to the objective conditions of social reality.  
                                               
56 On this, see the related comment by Leigh Binford in his article “Holloway’s Marxism”, Historical Materialism, 
vol.13(2005), 4, esp. pp.254-257. 
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But what could be the meaning of Holloway’s assertion that, from a 
Marxist point of view, the subject and its action are limited to a complementary 
role, "if not subjugated [!] to the objective movement of capitalism”? No matter 
how much one magnifies the importance of the subject, no matter how much 
one opens Marxism towards the side of subjectivity, as a Marxist, one cannot 
but limit oneself before subjectivism. The criteria for such delimitation -- 
violated by the epistemological and broadly philosophical subjectivism of the 
proponent of “open Marxism”, John Holloway-- have been clearly formulated by 
Marx himself: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”57 
At this precise point, the subjectivism that distinguishes Holloway's 
argumentation, or, better, his negations regarding Marxism as a science, meets 
his corresponding propositions about revolution, this deliberately incomplete 
theoretical plan of his about revolution today, a plan that the author evaded 
completing, in a vain attempt to avoid his meeting with the metaphysics of 
identity.  
Anyway, just before observing and evaluating, on a Marxist basis, this 
“incomplete symphony” of revolution proposed by Holloway, let us summarize our 
critique of his positions on Marxism as a science: 
 
Regarding the post-Marx Marxist tradition as an expression of positivism, 
scienticism and objectivism, Holloway rejects the dialectic of contradiction58 
and attempts a mechanistic inversion, which substitutes the positivist 
conception of science with a theology of Negation, the thesis of scientifism 
                                               
57 Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, as included in Marx-Engels, Werke, Vol.8, p..115 (English text available 
at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm).  But even through the critique of 
political economy, Marx clearly distances himself from subjectivism, with formulations such as the following: “Production 
thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object” (Introduction to Grundrisse, in Marx-Engels, 
Werke, ibid.., Vol.42, p.27, English text available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm) 
58 According to Phil Hearse in “Change the world without taking power?”, in Phil Hearse (ed.), Take the Power to change 
the World, Socialist Resistance, London 2007, pp.23-37, Holloway fails to comprehend that, to any Marxist, “contradiction 
in reality (not just thought) is a fundamental epistemological proposition of any real science.” 
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with activism, and that of objectivism with subjectivism. However, the problem 
with the epistemology of the Holloway’s anti-dialectical approach lies not only in 
the mechanistic character of this inversion, but also in its generalizing-leveling 
scope. As a result, the author of Change the World Without Taking Power ends 
up compressing the plurality of Marxist tendencies into a "caricature" Marxism, 
which he himself draws out and turns against.  
 
III. The ontological question: the cry of “abstract subjectivity” and the 
theology of Negation 
 
 “In the beginning is the scream. [...] Faced with the mutilation of human lives by 
capitalism, a scream of sadness, a scream of horror, a scream of anger, a 
scream of refusal: NO”.59 Holloway poses this existential inner voice as the 
ontological starting point of his reflection on the “meaning of revolution today”. 
It is an existential expression of the rejection of capitalism by those who are 
oppressed by this system, the “explosion of non-identity contained-in-but-
bursting-from-identity”.60 
We inevitably place this formulation side by side with the theological motto: “In 
the beginning was the Word!”. We do not, we cannot begin from the word, 
Holloway claims, but from the scream; this perhaps inarticulate expression of 
despair caused by all that we witness, but also of our refusal to continue 
witnessing it. Certainly, nothing can guarantee that these screams of distress 
and horror will not degenerate into a deep “sigh of the depressed” harmless to 
capitalism; a sigh that, from the beginning of the 1840s, Karl Marx linked to 
religion, the soul of a heartless world, none other than the "opium of the 
people". On the other hand, how can we pursue the transformation of the 
scream into a constituted critique of capitalism? Or should we avoid such a 
systematic critique, for fear of handing negation over to the deadly embrace of 
identity? In any case, such fear was unknown to Marx himself: 
                                               
59 Holloway,  ibid., p.1 
60 Ibid., p.7 
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“Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in 
order that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy 
or consolation, but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck 
the living flower. […] It is, therefore, the task of history, once the 
other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this 
world. It is the immediate task of philosophy, which is in the 
service of history, to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy 
forms once the holy form of human self-estrangement has been 
unmasked. Thus, the criticism of Heaven turns into the criticism of 
Earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the 
criticism of theology into the criticism of politics. “61 
What could the relation between Marx's critical discourse and Holloway's cry 
from within be? Certainly, for young Marx, the young Marx of the Contribution 
to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, the subject of revolution already 
has an identity: ”by heralding the dissolution of the hereto existing world order, 
the proletariat merely proclaims the secret of its own existence, for it is the 
factual dissolution of that world order”.62 In its articulation with those 
philosophers who do not content themselves with interpreting the world but 
wish to contribute to changing it, the proletariat expresses and acts upon 
Negation, not in an abstract, but in a very specific way: “By demanding the 
negation of private property, the proletariat merely raises to the rank of a 
principle of society what society has raised to the rank of its principle”.63 
 
I would not be focusing my attention on this Marxian logic of the specific, this 
Marxian ontology of the subject --that attempts to discover and reveal the 
"secret of its existence" as proletariat, meaning as a class that negates class 
                                               
61 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Introduction, ibid. p. 379 [English translation available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm)  
62 Ibid., p.391 [English translation available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-
hpr/intro.htm)  
63 Ibid., [English translation available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-
hpr/intro.htm)  
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society-- were it not because, in a sense, Holloway moves towards the opposite 
direction, one dictated by the principle of the indeterminacy of the subject, 
or, as he prefers, of subjectivity.  
As the author of Change the World Without Taking Power notes, 
“The aim of this book is to strengthen negativity, to take the side 
of the fly in the web, to make the scream more strident. We quite 
consciously start from the subject, or at least from an undefined 
subjectivity, aware of all the problems that this implies” 64 
This point calls for a more detailed analysis. In a statement that lays no claim to 
originality, Holloway will remind us that, contrary to animals, humans act as 
subjects, in the sense that “subjectivity refers to the conscious projection 
beyond that which exists, the ability to negate that which exists and to create 
something that does not yet exist”.65 However, in this case, one must accept 
that the ontological primacy of negation defended by Holloway's line of 
argument cannot and must not be mechanically severed from the quality of truly 
active people to plan and, in this sense, to set the goal of creativity, meaning of 
the formation of a new world at a micro-social as well as a macro-social level.   
The dialectical comprehension of social becoming results from a double 
delimitation against the theology of Negation on the one hand, and the servile, 
i.e. non-critical, adherence to the thesis. The history of ideas and movements 
has experienced, and continues to experience in different variations, both anti-
dialectical versions: either under the form of a Stirnerist anarchism, in the 
first case, or of positivism and its political expressions at different times, in 
the second. However, in what concerns a contemporary theory of revolution and 
its subjects, the issue is still –as it has been during past critical periods in the 
history of movements of social emancipation-- to comprehend subjectivity in a 
way that breaks with both the abstract negation of social reality and the 
passive submission and adoration of it.   
                                               
64 Holloway, ibid. , p.8 
65 Ibid., pp.25-26 
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In this sense, it is obvious that the “scream of complete refusal to accept 
the misery of capitalist society” alone, to use Holloway’s exact formulation,66 is 
not enough to radically challenge this society. But enough. If one wanted to 
follow Holloway's line of argument, as has been correctly stated, one should try 
to at least answer the obvious question: “Why did all those cries, those millions 
of cries, repeated millions of times over, not only leave capital’s despotic order 
standing but even leave it more arrogant than ever?” 67 
For a radical questioning of capitalist society not to be consumed in acts 
of letting off steam or in the sigh of the weak faced with their everyday 
martyrdom, there must be an activation of the ontological dimension of humans, 
which is equally important as that of negation and is currently suspended in 
multiple ways: the capacity to set goals, to draw plans, to live the future beyond 
the suffocating limits of the present. The more radically the subject, i.e. the 
truly active person, negates its given situation, the more it tends to set the 
foundations for a new mode of organisation of its social and personal life. 
Through negation, the subject, be it individual or collective, simultaneously tends 
towards the formation of its identity.  
However, according to Holloway, definition in the broader sense as well as the 
definition of the identity of the subject, more specifically, is the moment of 
death of subjectivity, which will either be vague or will be reduced to the 
fetishised world of objects. “Definition delimits us, denies our active 
subjectivity”,68 Holloway claims in an attempt to schematically interpret, for the 
needs of his own argumentation, the Spinozian phrase «omnis determinatio 
negatio est». Thus, he suggests the following critical ontological and 
methodological distinction between subjectivity and identity.  
 
                                               
66 Ibid., p.26 
67 Daniel Bensaїd, “La revolution sans prendre le pouvoir? À propos d’un recent livre de John Holloway”, Contretemps, 
No. 6(Février 2003), p.47 (English translation availabe at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/bensaid/2005/xx/holloway.htm  
68 Holloway, ibid, p.62 
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“For bourgeois theory, subjectivity is identity, whereas in our 
argument, subjectivity is the negation of identity. […] 
Much of what is seen as a [postmodern] attack on subjectivity is simply 
an attack on identity, on the bourgeois identification of subjectivity with 
identity. […] To identify the bourgeois subject with subjectivity as a 
whole, however, is a most murderous throwing of the baby out with the 
bathwater. To confound subjectivity with identity and criticize 
subjectivity in an attempt to attack identity leads only to a total impasse, 
since subjectivity, as movement, as negation of is-ness, is the only 
possible basis for going beyond identity, and therefore beyond the 
bourgeois subject”.69 
Without doubt, this anti-dialectical --at least from a Marxist point of view-- 
reasoning of Holloway is imbued by Adorno’s negative dialectics. Once again, we 
stand before a fetishism of the concept. According to the author of Change 
the World Without Taking Power, the concept of identity stands against that 
of subjectivity in a schematic and absolute manner. Subjectivity represents the 
active, subversive, negative load of the human being. On the other hand, identity 
expresses the inert, passive and, in this precise sense, apologetic stance of 
human beings faced with the conditions of their own lives.  
And yet, from the viewpoint of a dialectical approach to this matter, 
subjectivity, when moving subversively within the class field of the capitalist 
society, cannot but tend towards the constitution of its revolutionary identity. 
The transition from class in itself to class for itself is what constitutes this 
precise process of unveiling –and not constructing!-- the identity of the class 
subject, a process that leads to a borderline convergence of object and subject, 
being and consciousness. If, according to Holloway, bourgeois theory equates 
subjectivity to identity, revolutionary/communist theory considers that 
subjectivity cannot be deduced through a mechanistic inversion, i.e. as the 
“negation of identity”. The subject acts in a revolutionary way not when it 
                                               
69 Ibid., pp.70-71 
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abstractly negates the identity imposed upon it by capitalism, but when it moves 
towards self-determination, when it tries to constitute its own sui generis 
class/non-class identity. Without setting the goal of transforming abstract 
subjectivity into a concrete subjectivity through action, the potential of 
individual and collective subjects cannot be transformed into revolutionary 
action. In any case, the pursuit of identity, as well as its rejection, is an 
ontological component of humans as social beings.  
In this sense, identity is not “an illusion really generated by the struggle 
to identify the non-identical”,70 as Holloway claims. Identity is the, albeit 
temporary, condensation of a process which moves through the contrasts that 
define it. Abstract identity, failing of course to endure the contradiction, 
amounts to death. “Abstract self-identity is not as yet a livingness”, Hegel 
argues and goes on as follows: ”something is therefore alive only in so far as it 
contains contradiction within it, and moreover is this power to hold and endure 
the contradiction within it. But if an existent in its positive determination is at 
the same time incapable of reaching beyond its negative determination and 
holding the one firmly in the other, is incapable of containing contradiction 
within it, then it is not the living unity itself, not ground, but in the contradiction 
falls to the ground.”71 
In perceiving identity only as its abstract, dead version, Holloway ignores 
the version of concrete identity, the identity that still encloses a moving 
contradiction.72 He essentially fails to comprehend that becoming is a result of 
the unity of being and non-being and, therefore, it is not limited to the moment 
of non-being, but also contains the moment of being, 73 just as contradiction 
                                               
70 Ibid., p.100. 
71 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik,  in Hegel, Werke. Vol. 6, Frankfurt a. M. 1979, p. 76. [English 
edition included in references, p.440] 
72 On this, see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Logik, §115, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grudrisse 
73 With the terminology of his Logic, Hegel approaches Being as follows: “Hence Being Determinate is (1) the unity of 
Being and Nothing, in which we get rid of the immediacy in these determinations, and their contradiction vanishes in 
their mutual connection –the unity in which they only constituent elements. And (2) since the result is the abolition of the 
contradiction, it comes in the shape of a simple unity with itself: that is to say, it also is Being, but Being with negation or 
determianteness: it is Becoming expressly put in the form of one of its elements, viz. Being” (Logik, §89, Enzyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grudrisse [English edition included in references]) 
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«contains not merely the negative, but also the positive […]. The result of 
contradiction is not merely nullity. The positive and negative constitute the 
positedness of the self-subsistence. Their own negation of themselves sublates 
the positedness of the self-subsistence. It is this which in truth perishes in 
contradiction.» 74  
In the last analysis, the anti-dialectical character of Holloway’s line of 
thought does not allow him to comprehend that, for Marx, just as for his 
teacher, Hegel, the ground of existence is not only identity, but neither is it 
only difference: “The Ground is the unity of identity and difference"75 and, in 
this sense, it is only through their unity --and not through the absolutisation of 
their opposition-- that the two moments express the truth of man/woman as a 
struggling subjectivity.  
Clearly, the opening of identities, as of categories in general, “to reveal 
that their content is struggle”76 presupposes in some cases its determinate 
negation, meaning to lay siege to it through the action of a subjectivity that is in 
the course of being concrete. Through this process, the subject is posited as an 
identity, temporarily solving the nexus of contradictions that move it and define 
it as such; however, precisely because it is constituted at the limit of --and is 
delimited through-- contradiction, it is simultaneously driven to exit itself, to 
negate its own identity. In terms of the Hegelian dialectics of the Idea, the 
limit between being and non-being, moving towards and across the borderline, is 
characterised by unrest.77 In terms of a Marxist dialectics, unrest is an 
ontological feature of human existence, the struggle of the subject not 
only to negate power, but also to plan -as a negation of this negation- the 
setting of the foundations for a new world.  
 
                                               
74 Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, ο.π.,p.67 [English edition included in references, p.433]) 
75 Hegel, Logik, §121, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grudrisse [English edition included in references]) 
76 Holloway, ibid. p.89 
77 Βλ. την εξής χαρακτηριστική διατύπωση στο Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, ο.π.,p.138: «The other determination is the 
unrest of the something in its limit in which it is immanent, an unrest which is the contradiction which impels the 
something out beyond itself. Thus the point is this dialectic of its own self to become a line, the line to become a plane, and 
the plane the dialectic to become total space.” [English edition included in references, p.128] 
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Only through the prism of such an ontological approach --that 
recognizes the Setzung, the positing of a goal, as a basic ontological 
characteristic of human existence without identifying objectivisation 
and alienation, as Holloway erroneously does--78 can the activity of truly 
active people be conceived in its core as praxis. Marx wrote about the 
Setzung in the pages of his Capital, 79 but it was Marxist theorist Lukács 
who developed a much more detailed analysis in his argumentation for an 
ontology of social being that is also focused on the labour process:  
“Marx’s ontology of social being just as sharply rules out a simple, 
vulgar materialist transfer of natural laws to society, as was 
fashionable for example in the era of ‘social Darwinism’. The 
objective forms of social being grow out of natural being in the 
course of the rise and development of social practice, and become 
ever more expressly social. This growth is certainly a dialectical 
process, which begins with a leap, with the teleological project 
(Setzung) in labour, for which there is no analogy in nature. This 
ontological leap is in no way negated by the fact that it involves in 
reality a very lengthy process, with innumerable transitional forms. 
With the act of teleological projection (Setzung) in labour, social 
being itself is now there. The historical process of its development 
involves the most important transformation of this ‘in itself’ into a 
‘for itself’, and hence the tendency towards the overcoming of 
                                               
78 On this, Michael Löwy is very much to the point in his critique of Holloway's thesis, Review of “Change the World 
without Taking Power”, (2002), in Phil Hearse (ed.), Take the Power to change the World, ibid. pp.79-83 
79“We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble 
those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the 
worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. 
At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its 
commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose 
of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will”.  (Marx, Capital, in 
MEW, Vol.23, p.193 [English translation available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-
c1/ch07.htm) 
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merely natural forms and contents of being by forms and contents 
that are ever more pure and specifically social. 
The teleological project (Setzung) as a form of material 
transformation of material reality remains something 
fundamentally new from the ontological point of view”.80 
The fact that Marx and Lukács approach the Setzung, the teleological 
projection, as it is rendered manifest in the labour process, as a socially 
constituted and cultivated ontological human characteristic, allows for the 
admittance of this ontological starting point in the approach to the communist 
revolution too as, in this sense, a teleological process par excellence. In this 
case, based upon the scientific study of the tendencies that rule historical 
conditions, all we have to do is project the revolutionary plan on the screen of 
the future and pose as our end, in the sense of a goal, the revolutionary change 
of the world in a communist direction.  
From this viewpoint, it is obvious that the cries of denunciation, and even 
the collective negation of the capitalist order, will not suffice. No matter how 
much Holloway might insist, the meaning of revolution today –recalling the 
subtitle of his book—just as yesterday, just as tomorrow, cannot be limited to 
negation. The demon of telos haunts human existence and, in this sense, it is 
inherent in the revolutionary process itself, in the planning and selection of the 
means for the realisation of the communist society. Negation, when anti-
dialectically severed from concrete possibility, from the goal of the communist 
society, is condemned to reduce the revolutionary dynamic to an event or to the 
events of one or more uprisings. Such events denounce the capitalist world in a 
phantasmagoric way only to be then turned by this precise world into 
picturesque moments of its ongoing domination.   
In this case, the crucial issue is not univocally reduced to perceiving doing 
as an open process “impregnated with negativity”.81 Besides, Holloway correctly 
                                               
80 Georg Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being (2. Marx), The Merlin Press, London 1978, p.7 
81 Holloway, ibid. p.23 
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specifies that “in the tense and tired couple dialectical materialism, dialectics 
has precedence. Our thought is negative, therefore materialist”.82 However, 
what he insistently does not perceive is the fact that, although doing encloses 
the moment of negation, in no case is it limited to it. In a provokingly 
contradictory way, Holloway admits that “projection-beyond is seen by Marx as 
a distinctive characteristic of human doing”83 but, at the same time, using the 
abovementioned famous Marxian comparison between the spider (and the bee) 
with the architect, he insists that human doing begins and is completed through 
the negation of what exists: 
“The doing of the architect is negative, not only in its result, but in 
its whole process: it begins and ends with the negation of what 
exists. Even if she is the worst of architects, the doing is a 
creative doing”.84 
But enough! This faith in the demonic force of Negation, this unquenchable 
passion that is engendered by submission to the demon of Negation, this 
"Mephistophelian spirit” that Holloway serves85 --a spirit the he himself 
counterposes to the fullness of the plain life of Francis of Assisi, called upon by 
the authors of Empire, Hardt and Negri—does not express, in its one-
sidedness, the theory and practice of the communist revolution. 86 
If doing began and ended in the negation of what exists, it could not 
possibly be creative. And it is creative, because it begins with the negation of 
what exists and, through projection-beyond, through setting goals and planning 
the actions and the means necessary to achieve them, it leads to the negation 
of negation. If people are ecstatic while animals are not, as Holloway claims, i.e. 
if “they exist not only in, but also against-and-beyond themselves”,87 that 
                                               
82 Ibid., Ch.3, fn.8, p.217 
83 Ibid., p.24 
84 Ibid., pp.24-25 
85 Ibid., p.151 
86 Ibid., pp.174-175. On this, also see the interesting comments by Alex Callinicos, “Sympathy for the 
devil? John Holloway’s Mephistophelian Marxism”, CAPITAL & CLASS 85(2005) [with an answer by John Holloway]. 
87 Ibid., p.25 
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simultaneously means that, in negating what negates their existence, as 
subjects-creators, they set the foundations for a new way of organizing their 
own lives.  
 
To sum up: Holloway’s interest is riveted to the Unruhe, the unrest that 
characterizes the subject that, driven by its contradictions, borders its limits 
and negates an identity resulting from its struggling against something else. 
Thus, the theorist of open Marxism is compelled to break all contact with the 
moment of the negation of negation and, ultimately, with dialectics itself. Hegel, 
in his attempt for non-identity to be absorbed by the philosophy of identity, 
proved --as Adorno claimed-- that he "lacks sympathy with the utopian 
particular that has been buried underneath the universal”.88 On the contrary, 
Holloway’s liking of the utopia of the specific and of non-identity --on a 
philosophical and, ultimately, sociopolitical level—is such, that he gives in 
unconditionally to the demonic, Mephistophelian spirit of negation. In his effort 
to avoid the “deification of History”, this Vergötterung of History that Adorno 
had once again denounced in his Negative Dialectics, blaming even "the atheistic 
Hegelians, Marx and Engels"89 for it, the author of Change the World Without 
Taking Power ended up as a follower of the theology of Negation. 
 
IV. The sociopolitical issue: power and revolution  
 
Holloway’s focus on the core of a social theory of emancipation is marked by a 
distinction, of Spinozian inspiration, between power-to (potentia) and power-
over (potestas). Through the prism of an ontology of the social being, power-to 
expresses precisely this particularity of man as a social being that negates the 
limits and conditions of his own existence, sets goals and draws out plans to 
achieve them. On the other hand, as a process aimed at manipulating every 
                                               
88 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt  am Main 1966, p..312 (English translation 
available at  www.book.s.google.gr) 
89 Ibid., p..315  
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subversive social dynamic, power-over acts antagonistically and oppressively 
upon power-to, controlling the power-to of suppressed individuals in benefit of 
its own individual or collective bearer.  
 
In the words of Holloway himself,  
“The antagonistic existence of doing can be formulated in 
different ways: as an antagonism between power-to and power-
over, between doing and labour, between done and capital, between 
utility (use value) and value, between social flow of doing and 
fragmentation. [...] ‘Power’, then, is a confusing term which conceals 
an antagonism (and does so in a way that reflects the power of the 
powerful). ‘Power’ is used in two quite different senses, as power-to 
and as power-over. [...] Power-to exists as power-over, but the 
power-to is subjected to and in rebellion against power-over, and 
power-over is nothing but, and therefore, absolutely dependent 
upon, the metamorphosis of power-to.  
The struggle of the scream is the struggle to liberate power-to 
from power-over, the struggle to liberate doing from labour, to 
liberate subjectivity from its own objectification.”90 
At this point, the author's intention to achieve an opening of a fetish category, 
in this case power, is once again obvious. Turning against Foucault, who “fails to 
open up the category of power, to point to the fundamental antagonism that 
characterizes it”,91 Holloway attempts to achieve this precise opening by 
treating potentia and potestas as clashing components/aspects of a whole: 
“power-to exists as power-over: power-over is the form of power-to, a form 
which denies its substance”.92 In other words, if Foucault’s analysis of power, as 
Holloway claims, is a “change from one still photograph to another, but no 
                                               
90 Holloway, ibid. pp. 34-35, 36 
91 Ibid., p.42 
92 Ibid., p.40 
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movement”,93 the author of Change the World Without Taking Power tries to 
project anti-power not as the mechanical reflection of power-over, but as the 
emancipation of power-to from the class ties imposed upon it by power-over.  
Anti-power is, in essence, the social equivalent to the burden that 
Holloway attributes to Negation within the context of his philosophical and 
ontological reasoning. Anti-power, as its proponent argues, does not invert, but 
rather negates the conditions of existence and reproduction of power.94 
However, he insists, eminent Marxist revolutionaries, such as the leaders of the 
Russian and Chinese revolutions, trapped in the logic of a schematic inversion 
(bourgeois power-proletarian power) failed to radically reject the class society 
of their times.  
So, escalating his argumentation to the level of a theory of social struggle, 
Holloway formulates the target of his critique with the greatest possible 
clarity:  
 
“From the perspective of the scream, the Leninist aphorism that 
power is a matter of who-whom is absolutely false, as indeed is the 
Maoist saying that power comes out of the barrel of a gun: power-
over may come out of the barrel of a gun, but  not power-to. The 
struggle to liberate power-to is not the struggle to construct a 
counter-power, but rather an anti-power, something that is 
radically different from power-over. Concepts of revolution that 
focus on the taking of power are typically centered on the notion 
of counter-power. The strategy is to construct a counter-power, a 
                                               
93 Ibid., p.40 
94 In any case, it must be noted, as Marcel Stoetzler correctly does in“On How to Make Adorno Scream, some Notes on 
John Holloway’s Change the World without Taking Power”, Historical Materialism, Vol.13(2005), Issue 4, pp.193-215, that in 
Holloway's analysis “the concept of ‘anti-power’ is dangerous as long as it remains under-determined. Not every force 
that opposes the currently predominant form of ‘power’ works in the service of communism, and the concept of ‘anti-
power’ needed to be defined more closely until it stands the test of reversal: do, for example, fascist anti-statism and 
antisemitic anti-capitalism also fit under the category of ‘anti-power’? Although we might share Holloway’s suspicion 
that Adorno’s refusal to publicly support any specific oppositional political agenda may have been overstretched, we still 
have to take Adorno’s suspicion that apparent opposition might really be a form of affirmation dead seriously”.  
 48 
 
power that can stand against the ruling power. Often the 
revolutionary movement has been constructed as a mirror image of 
power, army against army, party against party, with the result that 
power reproduces itself within the revolution itself. Anti-power, 
then, is not counter-power, but something much more radical: it is 
the dissolution of power-over, the emancipation of power-to. This 
is the great, absurd, inevitable challenge of the communist dream: 
to create a society free of power relations through the dissolution 
of power-over. This project is far more radical than any notion of 
revolution based on the conquest of power and at the same time 
far more realistic.”95 
 
However, what concept of revolution was ever based solely on taking power? 
Definitely not the Marxist theory of Lenin, Trotsky, Mao or Gramsci. As we 
shall discover further on, Holloway does not overlook –how could he, actually?—
the fact that Marx’s own theory of the state and revolution is not reduced to 
the issue of taking power. On the contrary: it was founded and developed 
through the thesis of the shattering (zerbrechen) of the bourgeois state 
machinery as a conditio sine qua non for the transition towards a communist 
society, a society without a state or classes. Just listen to Marx’s own words: 
If you look at the last chapter of my Eighteenth Brumaire you will 
find that I say that the next attempt of the French revolution will 
be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military 
machine from one hand to another, but to smash it, and this is 
essential for every real people's revolution on the Continent.96 
                                               
95 Ibid., p.36-37 
96 Marx’s letter to Kugelmann, April 12th, 1871. The relative excerpt from the 18th Brumaire, included in Marx-Engels, 
Werke, Vol.8, p.197, goes like this: “All revolutions [until now] perfected this [State] machine instead of breaking it. The 
parties, which alternately contended for domination, regarded the possession of this huge state structure as the chief 
spoils of the victor.”  
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And yet, this radical approach to the issue of revolution and political power --an 
approach that was later on appropriated and analyzed, amongst others, by Lenin, 
in the third chapter of The State and Revolution, and also by many other 
Marxist theorists—is bypassed by Holloway with an, admittedly admirable, 
verbal pirouette:  
“But, it might be objected”, the proponent of anti-power admits, 
that “Lenin spoke not just of conquering state power but of 
smashing the old state and replacing it with a worker’s state, and 
both he and Trotsky were more than aware that the revolution 
had to be international to be successful. All this is true, and it is 
important to avoid crude caricatures, but the fact remains that 
the capturing of the state has generally been seen as a particularly 
important element, a focal point in the process of social change, 
one which demands a focusing of the energies devoted to social 
transformation. The focusing inevitably privileges the state as a 
site of power.”97 
But how does Holloway himself avoid the use of crude caricatures when he once 
again resorts to arbitrary generalisations and claims that “the capturing of the 
state has generally been seen as a particularly important element, a focal point 
in the process of social change”? Let's, at last, “render unto Caesar the things 
that are Caesar's”. This opinion has not been defended generally, but very 
particularly in the context of the reformist tradition of European Social-
democracy and not by the representatives of revolutionary Marxism. If 
Bernstein’s logic of reform, as developed in his Preconditions of Socialism and 
Kautsky’s “orthodox Marxism”, as expressed in The Social Revolution and The 
Road to Power, reduced parliamentary democracy and its mechanisms to 
fetishes, for Marxists such as Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky or Gramsci, on the 
contrary, the dialectics of the state and revolution is not conceived in terms of 
                                               
97 Holloway, ibid, p.15 
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assuming or taking power, but of crushing the bourgeois state machinery in each 
and every one of its institutional and operational expressions.98 
However, in his effort to radically counterpose power to anti-power, 
Holloway must bypass such theoretical issues!  
“It would seem that the most realistic way to change society is to 
focus struggle on the winning of state power and to subordinate 
struggle to this end. First we win power and then we shall create a 
society worthy of humanity. This is the powerfully realistic 
argument of Lenin, especially in What is to be Done?, but it is a 
logic shared by all the major revolutionary leaders of the 
twentieth century: Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky, Gramsci, Mao, Che. 
Yet the experience of their struggles suggests that the accepted 
realism of the revolutionary tradition is profoundly unrealistic. 
That realism is the realism of power and can do no more than 
reproduce power.”99 
This does not occur by chance. Despite his claims to opening concepts, Holloway 
succumbs to their fetishisation or demonisation, at an epistemological and 
ontological, as well as a sociopolitical level. Science, identity and power are taboo 
concepts, notions that --according to the author-- pin down the subject and lead 
it to its death. The only way to avoid the unavoidable is inversion, an inversion 
that, in Holloway's case, is dictated not by dialectics, but by formal logic.  
In terms of cognitive theory, the track followed upon by the author of 
Change the World Without Taking Power is very clear: from the dialectical 
reasoning of Hegel and Marx straight back to Cartesian thought. In terms of 
social and political theory, however, the rejection of the theses of revolutionary 
                                               
98  To categorically contradict Holloway's argumentation, one needs simply to point out Lenin's own critical comments 
on the theses developed by Kautsky in his works The Social Revolution and The Road to Power. The comments can be 
found in the drafts as well as the final text of The State and Revolution where, contrary to what Holloway claims, the 
emphasis is not put on the taking, but  on the crushing of the power institutions of the brougeois state.  
99 Holloway,ibid., p.18 
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Marxism, mutatis mutandis, marks a regression which is equivalent to the 
stereotypical anarchist argumentation of the 19th century: 
“The struggle […] is lost once power itself seeps into the struggle, 
once the logic of power becomes the logic of the revolutionary 
process, once the negative of refusal is converted into the positive 
of power-building. […]  They do not see that if we revolt against 
capitalism, it is not because we want a different system of power, 
it is because we want a society in which power relations are 
dissolved. You cannot build a society of non-power relations by 
conquering power. Once the logic of power is adopted, the struggle 
against power is already lost”.100 
Indeed, on the basis of such formulations, an issue of mechanistic approach, a 
question of a formal reflection of the theory of communist revolution arises. In 
fact, this formal reflection is not representative of Marxist analysis of the 
relation between bourgeois and proletarian power, as Holloway claims. For the 
theorists of revolutionary Marxism, for whom dialectics is the algebra and not 
the arithmetic of revolution, the notions of bourgeois and proletarian rule are 
asymmetrical and   cannot be fitted into an inflexible and predefined linear 
relation of first/after.101 
From a Marxist point of view, the crushing of the bourgeois state is 
conceived dialectically: firstly as negation and, secondly, as the negation of 
negation, as the crushing of institutions and mechanisms of bourgeois rule, but 
also as the construction of particular new institutions, the institutions of the 
                                               
100 Ibid., p.17 
101 It is this precise linear relation of a before/after that Marx challenges when referring to the proletarian revolutions in 
the 18th Brumaire (MEW, ibid., Vol.8, p.118 [English translation available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/hist-mat/18-brum/ch01.htm):   
“Proletarian revolutions, like those of the nineteenth century, constantly criticize themselves, constantly interrupt 
themselves in their own course, return to the apparently accomplished, in order to begin anew; they deride with cruel 
thoroughness the half-measures, weaknesses, and paltriness of their first attempts, seem to throw down their opponents 
only so the latter may draw new strength from the earth and rise before them again more gigantic than ever, recoil 
constantly from the indefinite colossalness of their own goals -- until a situation is created which makes all turning back 
impossible, and the conditions themselves call out:  
Hic Rhodus, hic salta! 
Here is the rose, here dance!” 
 52 
 
transitional revolutionary proletarian rule. They are the two sides of that 
moment of mediation, the two sides of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a 
first-level communist society, not enforced because of reasons of conjuncture, 
such as the scant development of the productive forces or the low index of 
nationalisation of capital, but in all cases due to necessity; for, as Marx himself 
asserted, we do not have the right to ignore or forget that, in the beginning 
“what we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed 
on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist 
society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, 
still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it 
emerges”.102 
So, I insist: in the Marxist theory of revolution, proletarian rule in the 
form of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not posed as an inverted image of 
bourgeois rule; for the theorists of revolutionary Marxism, there is asymmetry 
between bourgeois and proletarian rule, in form as well as in content. It is not, 
therefore, revolutionary Marxism, but the formal logic of the proponent of 
anti-power that fails to theoretically conceive power itself through its 
contradictions. It is Holloway’s simplifying approach that fails to comprehend 
historical processes and moments in their complexity and contemporariness, 
such as the 1917 Russian dual power, where bourgeois and proletarian power, 
the parliament and the soviet, intersected in a context of intense class struggle. 
It is not the Marxism of the 20th-century revolutions that is trapped in the 
deadly allure of an inverted reflection, but Holloway's discourse through the 
schematic confrontation of power and anti-power, just as the discourse of 
Bakunin and his comrades had been trapped a century-and-a-half ago.  
“If we cannot change the world through the state, then how?”, 
Holloway wonders. “The state is just a node in a web of power 
relations. But will we not be always caught up in the web of power, 
                                               
102 Karl Marx, The Critique of the Gotha Programme, in Marx-Engels, Werke, Vol.19, p.20. (English version available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch01.htm. ) 
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no matter where we start? Is rupture really conceivable? Are we 
not trapped in an endless circularity of power? […] 
The only way in which the idea of revolution can be maintained is by 
raising the stakes. The problem of the traditional concept of 
revolution is perhaps not that it aimed too high, but that it aimed 
too low. […] What has failed is the notion that revolution means 
capturing power[…] The only way in which revolution can now be 
imagined is not as the conquest of power but as the dissolution of 
power. The fall of the Soviet Union not only meant disillusionment 
for millions; it also brought the liberation of revolutionary thought, 
the liberation from the identification of revolution with the 
conquest of power”.103 
However, revolutionary thought, as it is founded and as it develops through the 
history of social movements, does not lack subversive scope and effectiveness 
because revolution is generally identified with taking power, but because it fails 
to mobilize "material forces" in an anti-capitalist and, ultimately, communist 
direction. To imagine revolution not as a taking but as an abolishing of power is 
not enough to stop power from expanding and reproducing itself. The issue of 
how to achieve this abolition cannot be dealt with in abstracto, "as if by magic", 
but in concreto, through specific strategies and tactics; in this sense, Holloway’s 
abstract discourse, the utopia of a hic et nunc abolition of power, brings to mind 
the "simple and childish fantasies" of those Young Hegelians, whom Marx and 
Engels caustically criticised using the following parable: “Once upon a time a 
valiant fellow had the idea that men were drowned in water only because they 
were possessed with the idea of gravity. If they were to knock this notion out 
                                               
103 Holloway, ibid., pp.19-20. In the same line, see also: “Our scream is a scream of frustration, the discontent of the 
powerless. But if we are powerless, there is nothing we can do. And if we manage to become powerful, by building a 
party or taking up arms or winning an election, then we shall be no different from all the other powerful in history.  So 
there is no way out, no breaking the circularity of power. What can we do? Change the world without taking power” 
(ibid. p.10).   
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of their heads, say by stating it to be a superstition, a religious concept, they 
would be sublimely proof against any danger from water”.104 
Perhaps we are being unfair to Holloway! For the author of Change the 
World Without Taking Power, power is not an idea but a material reality. And 
yet, his approach to power is no different from that romantic idealism of the 
German philosophical heroes that Marx criticised. No doubt, power, the state, 
the party, the parliament are not ideas, but tangible processes, material 
institutions and mechanisms. But if we agree with Holloway’s argument, we are 
compelled to approach this materiality of the social world just as the valiant 
fellow of the Marxian narration dealt with gravity in the material world, as if it 
were simply an idea. No matter how much its proponent might insist, the idea 
that we can change the world without taking power has no more chances of 
becoming true than man has the capacity to free himself from the law of 
gravity.  
 
However, it is not only the strategy of taking state power that is targeted by 
Holloway’s theory of revolution in an anti-dialectical and rather schematic way. 
It is also the notion itself of the revolutionary subject, as well as the role of the 
party as an organised political vanguard of the labour class. Bypassing all the 
crucial tensions and nuances that marked the discussion of the so-called issue 
of organisation in the context of revolutionary Marxism, especially at the 
beginning of the 20th century and the course towards the October Revolution, 
the theorist of anti-power and revolution turns not only against the Bolsheviks, 
but also against the opinions of Luxemburg, Gramsci and Lukács and even those 
of council communists such as Pannekoek, repeatedly attacked by Holloway's 
undifferentiated discourse.  
Let us examine a representative excerpt of Change the World Without 
Taking Power. Although its critique is directed mainly against the theory of the 
party and class consciousness in the work of the young Lukács, History and Class 
                                               
104 Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, as included in Marx-Engels, Werke,  ibid., p.13-14 (English version 
abailable at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/preface.htm.) 
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Consciousness, it highlights the overall axis of Holloway's theoretical attack 
against the Marxist theoretical tradition:  
“Who is the critical-revolutionary subject? Who can have this 
‘imputed’ consciousness that is distinct from the psychological 
consciousness of the proletariat? Lukács resolves this problem by 
sleight of hand, by bringing in a deus ex machina: the bearer of the 
'correct class consciousness of the proletariat' is its organised 
form, the Communist Party.[…] 
The Party is drawn out of a hat. Unlike the tight and rigorous 
argument that characterises the essays as a whole, there is never 
any explanation of how the Party is able to go beyond reification 
and adopt the perspective of totality. In contrast to the long and 
detailed argument on the consciousness of the bourgeoisie and of 
the proletariat, the 'sublime role' of the Party as the 'bearer of 
class consciousness' is just asserted.[…] 
If the Party is simply drawn out of the hat, however, it is because 
it is in the hat from the beginning. The answer of the Party is 
already implicit in the way in which the theoretical problem is set 
up. From the beginning the whole question of dialectics, of 
overcoming reification, of class consciousness and of revolution is 
posed in terms of the category of totality […] However, the 
emphasis on totality immediately poses the question of the Know-
All: who is it that can know the totality? Clearly, in a reified world, 
it cannot be the proletariat itself, so it can only be some Knower 
who knows on behalf of the proletariat. The category of totality 
already implies the problematic (if not necessarily the answer) of 
the Party. […] The attempt to combat fetishism leads, because of 
the way in which fetishism is understood, to the creation (or 
consolidation) of a new fetish: the idea of a Hero (the Party) which 
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somehow stands above the reified social relations of which, 
however, it is inevitably a part.105 
Once again, Holloway constructs his ideological adversary in order for his line of 
argument to prevail. Which might be the "critical-revolutionary subject" that he 
recognizes in the theory and action of an all-knowing party, a party that is the 
hero and saviour of the working class itself? Which is the political organisation 
that acts on behalf of class, replacing it in its role? In the last analysis, is the 
party as proposed by Lenin or the party as a collective intellectual, defended by 
Gramsci, what Holloway describes and criticizes, or could it be that the 
proponent of anti-power presents the Blanquist conception of the political 
subject as if it were a Marxist theory of the party, a conspiratorial conception 
of a political organisation that acts on behalf of the revolutionary class and is 
not organically connected to it and to its movement? 
 
1. Firstly, Holloway is right in asserting that, no matter what meaning the 
Marxists give to subjectivity, the active factor in History, they all, each one in 
his own way, inscribe the action of the subject in the horizon of objective, 
historical necessity.106 But how else could a theory of revolution such as 
Marxism –drawing its limits against objectivism and, more specifically, 
economism-- avoid voluntarism, a theological faith in the unconditional and 
unlimited potential of the subject to shape its own history? 
"Whichever way around it is put, there is the same dualist separation 
between the objective and the subjective"107 Holloway critically insists, 
referring to the theoretical tradition of Marxism. However, the dualist 
separation between object and subject has to do with his own formal logic, and 
not with that of the Marxist theorists he turns against without reserve and 
distinction. For them, such fundamental separations as the one between object 
                                               
105 Holloway, ibid., p.83-84 
106 Ibid., pp.124-127 
107 Ibid, p.126 
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and subject are not dualist, but dialectical, they are a differentiation in unity 
and not a schematic confrontation of one pole against the other.  
Holloway’s failure to comprehend the role of the subject in the context 
of the materialist conception of History, founded by Marx and Engels and 
developed in their own way by theorists of the revolution such as Lenin, 
Luxemburg or Lukács, is also due to this point, to the gap that separates his 
thought from Marxian dialectics itself.  
 
2. However, if the relation between object and subject is dialectical and is 
comprehended as such in the context of revolutionary Marxism, then it cannot 
but be mediated. Thus, in political terms, the party appears as “drawn out of a 
hat”, as Holloway repeatedly asserts. There can be --and, in fact, there has 
been-- long, unending discussion on the nature of this mediation, i.e. on the 
organisational form of the political vanguard and the content of its action. 
However, anyone who reflects and tries to act in terms of a Marxist dialectics, 
no matter how openly this person might comprehend Marxism, cannot question 
the moment of mediation itself and, ultimately, the moment of politics.  
The political theory of Lenin, Lukács or Gramsci never treated the party 
as a "hero" or a "Messiah"; that is an approach that has long ago been 
considered trite and oversimplifying, an approach though adopted and 
reproduced by Holloway. The Marxist theoretical tradition does not consider 
the party to be a metaphysical concept, but rather a socially defined and 
politically necessary subject, whose form and content of action change 
according to historical conditions.  
I will not argue in more detail on this issue. But let us recall how Lenin 
invited his critics to approach What is to Be Done?, a book that poses the great 
questions on the relation between the spontaneous and the conscious, the 
working class and the intelligentsia, the working class and the political vanguard:  
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“The basic mistake made by those who now criticise What Is To 
Be Done? is to treat the pamphlet apart from its connection with 
the concrete historical situation of a definite, and now long past, 
period in the development of our Party. […] The organisation it 
[What is To Be Done?] advocates has no meaning apart from its 
connection with the ‘genuine revolutionary class that is 
spontaneously rising to struggle’”.108 
So, insofar as the political party is conceived in the context of shifting historical 
conditions and as a projected expression of the action of the revolutionary 
social subject, it is not considered --at least from the Marxist point of view -- 
as a deus ex machina, as Holloway wrongly claims. The role of an all-knowing 
bearer of metaphysical/theological truth, who imposes his will on the proletariat 
from above, has nothing to do with the Marxist theory of the party, of a 
collective political leader and organizer of the revolutionary movement.  
 
3. Even the schematic confrontation between the party and the movement 
that imbues Holloway's work in every possible way expresses the author's 
denial to reflect dialectically on the issue of revolution itself.109 That is why, to 
the question “party or soviet” that Lenin faced amidst the Russian 1905, 
Holloway could never give a dialectical answer as the leader of the Bolsheviks 
did: "the party and the soviet".110 For the dialectical Lenin, the development of a 
revolutionary movement such as the one appearing in Russia at the beginning of 
the 20th century not only does not exclude, but actually demands the issue of 
                                               
108 V.I.Lenin, Preface to the Collection Twelve Years, included in Lenin, Collected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1972, 
vol.13., pp.93-114 (English translation available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1907/sep/pref1907.htm)  
109As Alex Callinicos correctly points out in his confronting John Holloway, “A debate between John Holloway and 
Alex Callinicos. ‘Can we change the world without taking power?’”, World Social Forum, Porto Alegre (27 January 
2005), http://archive.iire.org/pamphlet_nsf_2006.pdf , the issue for a theory of revolution is still the combination of 
centralisation and self-organisation. "My ideal in this respect”, says Callinicos, “is the one articulated by the Great Italian 
revolutionary Antonio Gramsci. He talked about the dialectical interaction between the moment of centralisation 
represented by the parties and the self-organised impulse from the movement which is the fundamental driving force of 
revolution”. 
110 V.I. Lenin, “Our tasks and the Soviet of Worker's Deputies”, in Lenin, Collected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow 
1965, vol.10., pp.17-28 
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the organisation and action of a conscious political vanguard, of the 
revolutionary party itself. On the contrary, the proponent of anti-power and 
author of Change the World Without Taking Power considers the proletarian 
party as an inverted image of the bourgeois political parties, just as he 
considers the proletarian rule to be a symmetrical reflection of the bourgeois 
rule, and thus aphoristically concludes:   
“Whether or not it ever made sense to think of revolutionary 
change in terms of the 'Party’, it is no longer open to us to even 
pose the questions in those terms. To say now that the Party is the 
bearer of the class consciousness of the proletariat no longer 
makes any sense at all. What Party? There no longer exists even 
the social basis for creating such a 'Party'".111 
However, was there ever a Marxist theorist who treated the party as an a 
priori bearer of the revolutionary class consciousness of the proletariat? 
Holloway might possibly be trying to blame revolutionary Marxism for the 
mysticism with which Stalin and his own system of rule invested the party as a 
historical creation. If that is the case, however, he should prove why and how 
Marxist political theory is responsible for the Stalinist theory and practice of 
the party through a concrete analysis of the specific situation, instead of 
turning once more to the metaphysics of abstraction. 
 
4. Holloway is again right in stating that, from the beginning, the theoretical 
tradition of Marxism --with the theory of Lukács being perhaps the most 
characteristic and discussed case-- approaches issues such as class 
consciousness, revolution and political organisation through the viewpoint of 
totality. But how does he reach the conclusion, of which he tries to persuade all 
of us, that “emphasis on totality immediately poses the question of the Know-
All” and, more specifically, of the all-knowing party, which knows the truth on 
behalf of the proletariat? 
                                               
111 Holloway, ibid., p.85. 
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It is obvious that, in this case, Holloway's left-wing postmodernism 
attempts to construct a Marxism centered on a conception of a closed totality, 
which could be recognised in the context of a Hegelian philosophy of 
reconciliation, but is, however, miles apart from a Marxist category of totality. 
This type of open Marxism, one that, through the abolition of irreconcilable 
class struggle, detects not only the end, the closing of the prehistory of 
humanity, but also the beginning of its true history in the movement of a 
global communist society, is the open Marxism that Holloway insists on ignoring.  
Revolutionary Marxism, including that of Lukács, never considered totality 
as a given thing in its relation with the actions of the revolutionary-critical 
subject. As the author of History and Class Consciousness claims, the theory of 
totality can and should be conceived dialectically, because “only the dialectical 
conception of totality can enable us to understand reality as a social process”112 
In this precise sense, the Hungarian Marxist theorist delimits himself equally in 
relation to fatalism and voluntarism, and approaches the category of totality in 
its conceptual relation with the category of objective possibility, 
characteristically claiming that “the objective theory of class consciousness is 
the theory of its objective possibility”.113 
Let us repeat: insistence on totality in terms of a Marxist dialectics does 
not amount to the conception of an all-knowing party, neither does it presuppose 
the class consciousness of the proletariat, as Holloway erroneously asserts. 
Insistence on totality means to pursue a process which is open as to its 
outcome, the process of a social movement whose goal is to create a communist 
society, where not only the party but the working class itself is dissolved.  
So, if Holloway fails to keep up with the objective possibility of the 
working class to perform a leap from a situation where it only screams against 
capitalism, i.e. from a "class which opposes capitalism", to a class that 
consciously struggles against the capitalist system as a totality, i.e. a "class for 
                                               
112 Georg Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, Luchterhand, Darmstadt und Neustand 1986, p.77 [English 
translation available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm] 
113 Ibid., p.167 (English version available at  http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/lukacs3.htm) 
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itself ",114 it is certainly not because of the theory of Lukács and other 
important Marxist theorists on the party and class consciousness but, once 
again, because of Holloway's own refusal to adopt the viewpoint of Marxist 
dialectics.115 
In conclusion, the way in which Holloway tries to conceive, also on the 
sociopolitical level, "the meaning of revolution today" highlights the ideological, in 
the negative sense of the term, nature of his theory. As we already pointed out 
during the analysis of Holloway's epistemological and ontological preconditions 
for revolution, the theology of Negation, insofar as it demonizes science and 
even knowledge in the broader sense of the word,116 is none other but a return 
to the generalisations and fanciful rhetoric of anarchism and other related 
libertarian movements that have developed from the end of the 19th century. 
This return was made even clearer in terms of social and political theory, i.e. 
where the libertarian metaphysics of anti-power calls for an indiscriminate and 
unmediated negation and abstract condemnation of the State, as well as the 
party “in general”.117 The discourse of anti-power that emerges through the 
lines of Change the World Without Taking Power is a challenge not to Marxism, 
but to a "crude caricature” of Marxism, formed by elements of an anarchist-
oriented movement based on mechanistic and, in this sense, anti-dialectical 
patterns.  
                                               
114 Ibid, p.90 
115 At this point, we must underline yet another crucial methodological misstep committed by Holloway in his approach 
of this social-political issue: it goes without saying that a party which acts within History, a party which acts within an 
organic relationship with the revolutionary class and its movement, cannot and must not be confused with the ideotypical 
construction of a party-bearer of true labour class consciousness. However, Holloway falls into this precise error when he 
overlooks that what Lukács calls the zugerechnetes Bewußtsein, the imputed consciousness of the revolutionary class, to 
which he counterposes “psychological consciousness”, echoes the Weberian methodology of the “ideal types”. This 
methodology greatly influenced the author of History and Class Consciousness during the crucial period of his intellectual 
youth, and should not be confused with the party as a historical subject.   
116 Holloway, ibid., p.212: “The crisis of Marxism is the freeing of Marxism from dogmatism; the crisis of the 
revolutionary subject is the liberation of the subject from knowing” (emphasis added by me) 
117 Michael Löwy ‘s argumentation moves along the same line in his Review of “Change the World without Taking 
Power”, (2002), ibid, pp.79-83. This argumentation is contested by the author, who evades a direct approach to the points 
at issue: “Reply to Michael Löwy”, http://www.herramienta.com.ar/debate-sobre-cambiar-el-mundo/about-change-
world-without-taking-power-0. Holloway claims that this abstraction is the result, amongst others, of trying to distance 
himself from what he considers to be the “endless, deadening left-wing discussions of Stalin, Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, 
Kronstadt, etc.”! 
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V. An open-ended epilogue on revolution and communism  
 
In any case, there is a useful element in Holloway's theory of revolution and 
communism in the 21st century: it brings back to the fore of ideological 
discussion issues that had been posed during crucial moments and periods of 
the socialist-communist movement of the second half of the 19th and beginning 
of the 20th centuries. Issues that emerged, as I already mentioned, through the 
break between Marx and Bakunin, Marxism and anarchism, on the one hand, and 
through the clash between social democrats and Bolsheviks, on the other, an 
immense theoretical and political confrontation caused in the heart of the 
movement by the patriarch of revisionism, Eduard Bernstein, and by the 
evolution of the theses of Karl Kautsky, considered the theoretical 
representative of "orthodox Marxism".  
 
But how and towards which direction does Holloway return to the classic 
themes of the strategy and tactics of a global communist movement? Based on 
the previous analysis, I can now assert that, from an epistemological/ cognitive-
theoretical point of view, Holloway's proposals are marked by a crude anti-
scienticism which identifies science with positivism and, as a result, turns into 
agnosticism.  
Of course, the consequences of this agnosticism are not limited to the 
epistemological level; they are intensely developed in the author’s social and 
political conclusions.  
“The Leninists know, or used to know. We do not. Revolutionary 
change is more desperately urgent than ever, but we do not know 
any more what revolution means.118 
However, if we don’t know what revolution means, if we can’t define the 
“critical-revolutionary subject”, because “the critical-revolutionary subject is 
                                               
118 Holloway, Change the World Without Taking Power, The Meaning of Revolution Today, p. 215 
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not a defined ‘who’ but an undefined, indefinable, anti-definitional ‘what’”,119, 
then how do we make communism, what plan do we follow, how do we choose the 
goal and the means if we don’t want to “unconditionally” surrender to nihilism or 
at least to the spontaneous and the subjective? Indeed, Lenin knew or at least 
he tried to find out, adopting Marxism as a guide to action and firmly asserting 
that it is impossible to develop a revolutionary movement without revolutionary 
theory. In fact, he never had the certainty of a positivist ‘scientist’. “We, 
however, acted in conformity with the tenets of Marxism”, says the leader of 
the Bolsheviks and immediately links the general with the specific and the 
determinate with the unpredictable, in a display of dialectical acuteness: “At 
the same time, the political activities of the Central Committee in each concrete 
case were determined entirely by what was absolutely indispensable. We were 
often obliged to feel our way".120 (the emphasis is added by me) 
In this sense, the Zapatista phrase “asking we walk”, that Holloway uses in 
order to make his own agnosticism appear as anti-dogmatism,121 is not at the 
antipode of the supposedly dogmatic stance of Lenin and his colleagues. On the 
other hand, we must not underestimate the fact that the actual posing of 
questions is a crucial and by no means innocent process, both methodologically 
and politically. The content of the question, but also the way of posing it, 
presuppose a certain engagement, meaning a militant point of view; in this sense, 
the theorists of revolutionary Marxism never hid their identity as Marxists, 
their secondary differentiations notwithstanding. Holloway, on the contrary, as 
the representative of a postmodern left who is struggling to avoid this allegedly 
fatal attraction of identity, has nothing left to do but pay the price of his 
agnosticism.  
                                               
119 Ibid., p.150 
120 V.I. Lenin, Report Of The Central Committee ,  Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) March 18-23, 1919 [English 
translation available at  http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/rcp8th/02.htm]  
121 Also see Holloway's characteristic formulation: “Revolution cannot be understood as an answer, but only as a 
question, as an exploration in the creation of dignity. Asking we walk” (“Twelve theses on changing the world without 
taking power” [2004], in Phil Hearse (ed.), Take the Power to change the World, ibid., pp. 15-21, [also available at 
http://libcom.org/library/twelve-theses-on-changing-the-world-without-taking-power]) 
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In this case, as Daniel Bensaïd correctly claims, the fact that "we have 
difficulty in imagining the strategic form of revolutions to come […] is not 
something terribly new[…] So, renouncing dogmatic knowledge is not reason 
enough to make a tabula rasa of the past, providing that we save tradition (even 
revolutionary tradition) from the conformism that is always threatening it”.122 I 
have already insinuated this: criticism and self-criticism, a characteristic of 
proletarian revolutions according to Marx himself, are the most effective way 
of protecting revolutionaries from the Scylla of dogmatism, but also the 
Charybdis of nihilism. After all, revolutions do constitute an obvious break with 
the past, but they never start from naught.123 
 
However, one must not assume that the agnosticism of the proponent of anti-
power is diligently followed by Holloway himself. How could he support a theory 
of revolution when insisting on his fortress of agnosticism until the end? Even if 
Holloway and the unidentified revolutionary subject that is summoned to change 
the world without taking power do not know what revolution means, they do 
adopt and propose, as a regulating principle of doing, that “the idea of a 
communist revolution is to create a society in which we are not led, in which we 
all assume responsibility".124  
At this point, I cannot but comment: if German philosopher Immanuel 
Kant attempted to abstractly and formalistically reflect –for the purpose of 
pure practical reason—upon the ideal of a Kingdom of Ends (Reich der 
Zwecke), Holloway reflects with an equally abstract and formalistic way on the 
kingdom of communism as a result of the unlimited will of the subject to be 
self-determined and to change the world.  
                                               
122 Daniel Bensaïd,. “La revolution sans prendre le pouvoir? À propos d’un recent livre de John Holloway”, ibid, pp.45-
59 
123 It is once again Bensaïd, “Screams and spit. Twelve Comments Plus One more, to Continue the Debate with John 
Holloway” (2006), in Phil Hearse (ed.), Take the Power to change the World, Socialist Resistance, London 2007, pp.59-62 and 
on the internet: http://archive.iire.org/pamphlet_nsf_2006.pdf, the one who reminds us of Deleuze's phrase: "We 
always begin again from the middle".  
124 Holloway, Change the World Without Taking Power. The Meaning of Revolution Today, ibid. p.211 
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Let us remember that, as an ideal, the Kantian kingdom of ends is a 
“systematic union of different rational beings through common laws”, a union of 
people who have to act in a way that treats the other person “always as an end 
and never only as a means”, thus revealing the idea of dignity as a fundamental 
and regulating principle for the organisation of society:125 But for Holloway too 
“dignity is the refusal to accept humiliation, oppression, exploitation, 
dehumanisation”.126 With a discourse that is, indeed, imbued with humanism, the 
author of Change the World Without Taking Power insists: “It is not yet time to 
give up the dream of human dignity”.127 
However, how can the Marxian concept of [personal] freedom in the 
context of a communist society relate to the concept of dignity that is invested 
with the ingredients of a humanistic and, ultimately, idealistic rhetoric?128 What 
relation can there be between Holloway’s definition of communism as “social 
self-determination”129 with the Marxian materialist conception of communism 
not as an order that needs to be established nor as an ideal to which reality 
must adapt, but as a real movement that abolishes the current state of 
affairs?130 
The despair of those who scream and faith in the power of Negation are 
not enough to change the world order, the world outside us and the world 
within, in a communist direction. The subject develops its own dynamic, always 
according to the field in which it moves. Historical conditions are shaped by 
active people and, at the same time, the action of active people is defined by 
historical conditions, just as matter and its texture set limits to the expression 
of the person-creator. In this sense, for revolutionary Marxism, communism can 
                                               
125 Immanuel Kant,  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in  Akademieausgabe von Immanuel Kant Gesammelten 
Werken, pp.434-435 
126 Holloway, ibid., p.154 
127 Ibid., p.237 
128 Paul (D’)Amato is right in pointing out, in “The powerlessness of anti-power”, International Socialist Review, 
27(January-February 2003) that: “The philosophical underpinning of Holloway’s ideas is an idealism gleaned mostly 
from Foucault and from Theodor Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, [an idealism] that rejects all forms of positive definition as a 
process that both creates, and assumes, fixed relations of hierarchy and domination. Holloway’s is therefore a 
philosophy of pure ‘negation’" .  
129 Holloway, ibid. 
130 Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, ibid. p. 35 
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only emerge based on the knowledge of the tendencies that rule the field of 
operation of active subjects, History as a becoming. 
On the other hand, the need to know the tendencies that rule the 
historical contingencies must not lead to an approach of the strategy and 
tactics of the revolutionary movement in terms of an instrumental rationality. 
And in this sense Holloway is indeed right when he rejects the recipes for 
revolution and its organisation. "There can be no recipes for revolutionary 
organisation, simply because revolutionary organisation is anti-recipe”.131 But has 
any revolutionary Marxist tried to give out cook-books for revolution and 
communism? 
The author that does not know what revolution means but who appears, 
nonetheless, to know that the world can’t change by taking power, is very 
categorical in his estimations: “The orthodox Marxist tradition, most clearly the 
Leninist tradition, conceives of revolution instrumentally, as a means to an 
end”.132 
 
However, how easy is it to indiscriminately pin the instrumental approach 
to revolution on the Marxist theoretical tradition –which, besides, considers 
revolution to have a deeply educational and self-educational character? 
Revolution is not only a means for the achievement of the communist goal. 
Revolutionary Marxism perceives communism as a movement and a goal at the 
same time, a movement of the masses through which communism tends to 
transform from abstract possibility to concrete, historical reality. The Marxist 
theoretical approach to revolution in general and to revolutionary organisation 
more specifically is not of an instrumental type, contrary to what Holloway 
might assert. According to revolutionary Marxism, revolutionary organisation is 
organically and not instrumentally linked to the revolutionary class, as it is 
constituted on the basis of its principles and prefigures in micrography the 
society that it is struggling to create.  
                                               
131 Holloway, ibid., pp.213-214  
132 Ibid., p..214 
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As Marxist Georg Lukács characteristically mentions, 
“The party called upon to lead the proletarian revolution is not born 
ready-made into its leading role: it, too, is not but is becoming. And 
the process of fruitful interaction between party and class 
repeats itself –albeit differently—in the relationship between the 
party and its members. For as Marx said in his theses on 
Feuerbach: ‘The materialist doctrine concerning the changes of 
circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are 
changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated.’ 
The Leninist party concept represents the most radical break with 
the mechanistic and fatalistic vulgarisation of Marx.133 
In short: trapped in the abovementioned anti-dialectical/schematic 
confrontation between the spontaneous and the conscious, between movement 
and party, Holloway will not conceive revolution in a Marxist way as a plan, as 
Setzung, he cannot or will not conceive rebellion as an art with its own rules. If 
those rules are not acknowledged and put to use, even the most gifted 
improvisation of the subject will be reduced to an ineffective act of conspiracy 
of a Blanquist type or, as in Holloway's case, a fanciful and equally ineffective 
activism.  
But let us take a look at the dialectics of rebellion as Lenin, the theorist 
and practitioner of rebellion, conceives it:  
“Marxists are accused of Blanquism for treating insurrection as an 
art! Can there be a more flagrant perversion of the truth, when 
not a single Marxist will deny that it was Marx who expressed 
himself on this score in the most definite, precise and categorical 
manner, referring to insurrection specifically as an art, saying that 
it must be treated as an art, that you must win the first success 
and then proceed from success to success, never ceasing the 
                                               
133 Georg Lukács, Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his Thought, Verso,  London, 2009, p.37 
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offensive against the enemy, taking advantage of his confusion, 
etc., etc.?  
To be successful, insurrection must rely not upon conspiracy and 
not upon a party, but upon the advanced class. That is the first 
point. Insurrection must rely upon a revolutionary upsurge of the 
people. That is the second point. Insurrection must rely upon that 
turning-point in the history of the growing revolution when the 
activity of the advanced ranks of the people is at its height, and 
when the vacillations in the ranks of the enemy and in the ranks of 
the weak, half-hearted and irresolute friends of the revolution are 
strongest. That is the third point. And these three conditions for 
raising the question of insurrection distinguish Marxism from 
Blanquism.”134 
Rejecting infertile conspiratorial methods and principles that substitute the 
role of the movement of the masses with organisation –methods and principles 
which Holloway insists on "discovering" in the lines of Marxism-- Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks do rebellion as art: neither an arbitrary product of will nor a quasi 
natural outcome. At the limits of Marxist logic, rebellion as the art of revolution 
is not identified with the explosion of spontaneity, but neither is it an abstract 
"rational" design drawn out on blank paper. Rebellion, as the historical 
expression of the revolutionary process, is an art and, as such, it has its own 
laws. Although they set boundaries, these laws do not nullify the importance of 
improvisation on behalf of the active subject. This appearance of improvisation 
in the horizon of objective reality is precisely what an anti-dialectical reflection 
fails to grasp. Through the viewpoint dictated by the theology of Negation, the 
proponent of anti-power cannot but fall into the trap of accepting and adopting 
improvisation as a synonym of the omnipotence of volition and volition alone. 
To talk of revolution today, at the time of world capitalism, of collapse but 
also of social movements, means to seek and define the thin line between our 
                                               
134 V.I. Lenin, “Marxism and Insurrection” at http://www.marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/sep/13.htm  
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theoretical Marxist tradition and the need to highlight the new social and 
political situation at a national and international scale. It means to search for 
and define the relation of continuity and discontinuity between what is old and is 
dying, and what is new and cannot yet be born, to recall Gramsci's definition of 
crisis.   
But what place can the concept, the “moment” of crisis, has in a theory of 
revolution which, under the depressing weight of voluntarism, not only disturbs 
but defines the relation between revolutionary strategy and the tactics of a 
movement? Holloway’s opinion that the capitalist system is incapable of 
reproducing itself whenever the labour forces decide to go against capital's 
productive and reproductive process, is radically mistaken.135 It is a conception 
that, parting from the author’s declared intention to clash with determinism, 
falls into an undifferentiated/homogeneous social time, given that revolution 
and the exit from history is pronounced possible at any moment:  
If revolution is in the future, then capitalism is until that future 
comes.[…] History in this view acquires a revered importance. 
History is the building up towards the future event… […] The other 
conception of revolution says no: no to capitalism, revolution now. 
Revolution is already taking place. This may seem silly, immature, 
unrealistic, but it is not. […] In other words, we must break history, 
smash duration, shoot clocks. […] History is a nightmare from 
which we are desperately trying to awake.  Revolution must drive 
its cart and its plough over the bones of the dead.136 
How can anyone resist this torrent of voluntarism and optimism? If that’s how 
you believe it is, that is how it is! Holloway wastes no opportunity to state or 
insinuate the distance that separates him from the dialectics of freedom and 
                                               
135 As Leigh Binford  argues, ο.π., pp. 260-261, «the ubiquity and internality of ‘class’ struggle  notwithstanding, accepting 
Holloway’s confident assertion that just about anytime is the time for revolution requires an enormous leap of faith.” 
136 John Holloway, “No”, Historical Materialism, Vol.13 (2005), Issue 4,  pp.265-284 (for the specific excerpts,  pp.270-274). 
[also available at http://www.johnholloway.com.mx/2011/07/30/no/]) Holloway refers once again to the issue of 
time in the epilogue to the Greek edition of his work (ibid., pp.476-478)  
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necessity, of historical law and the volition of the subject. In the last analysis, 
he completely cuts himself off from strategy and politics, in the sense of a 
process that is organisationally constituted by, and at the same time 
constitutes, the subversive power of the revolutionary subject.137 So, then, 
there is nothing left but the anti-powerist instigation to transit from the 
traditional politics of organisation to the postmodern anti-politics of events: 
“Think of an anti-politics of events rather than a politics of 
organisation", Holloway urges us. “Or better: think of organisation 
not in terms of being but in terms of doing.[…] But the aim is not to 
reproduce and expand the caste of militants (the organisation) but 
to ‘blast open the continuum of history’ (Benjamin). The shift from 
a politics of organisation to a politics of events is already taking 
place”.138 
But why must organisation, political organisation, the organised political 
vanguard, be necessarily identified with a sect of militants? And how can we 
break the continuum of History if we do not repeat Lenin,139 if we do not 
incorporate the event into the dialectics of time, if we entrap rebellion in the 
present, if we disconnect revolution from its possibilities?140 What meaning is 
there in discussing revolution today if we do not draw inspiration from 
acknowledging --not imitating-- the past and getting to know the strategic 
issues that were posed then and that still continue to exist openly, mutatis 
mutandis, in our times? 
                                               
137 As Phil Hearse points out, ibid., p.30,  “in accepting that social relations can be directly transformed simply by the 
social practices of the oppressed, Holloway abandons the terrain of strategy, and indeed of politics altogether.”  
138 Holloway, Change the World Without Taking Power. The Meaning of Revolution Today, p.214 
139 Žižek, ibid., p.11 
140 In commenting Holloway’s claim that “events are flashes against fetishism, festivals of the non-subordinate, carnivals 
of the oppressed”, Daniel Bensaid, ibid., p.54, wonders: “Is carnival the form, found at long last, of the post-modern 
revolution?” 
Also see Marcel Stoetzler’s interesting observation, ibid., p.210, according to which Holloway’s favourite reference to 
revolutions as events of celebration does not necessarily entail the abolition of the existence and the role of a political 
vanguard, as Holloway himself would wish. As Stoetzler reminds us, and Holloway overlooks,  it is Lenin who, in the 
Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, calls revolutions the “festivals of the oppressed and the 
exploited"    
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To talk of revolution today means, to repeat Lenin, to once again talk of 
how to crush the bourgeois state in the context of the present. But it also 
means to ask ourselves, avoiding all tautologies and banalities, about the 
adventures of the dialectic between the state and revolution as it developed, 
before ending in tragedy, in the countries of "really existing socialism". After 
all, Stalin and his mechanism of rule are not an explanation, an answer to the 
problem, but rather a part of it. In this sense, Holloway rightly states that 
Stalinism must not be used --as it has been and still is, unfortunately-- as the 
perfect alibi so that a great part of the so-called revolutionary left will not 
trouble itself, will not enter into a critical confrontation with its own history.141 
Therefore, to talk of revolution today means to search for the structural 
causes --though not only them— of why the crushing of the tsarist state did 
not lead to the triumph of the soviets but to their death, only a few years after 
the victory of the October Revolution. Inevitably, such a discussion is radically 
distinct from Holloway's argumentation, which reduces, with no theoretical 
reserve, the polymorphous Marxist reflections on the revolutionary state and 
the party to the Stalinist authoritarian version of the "socialist" rule, and to the 
equally authoritarian Stalinist view on the relation between the vanguard and 
the masses.142 
I will not argue against the obvious and trivial: in a sense, Holloway is right 
in claiming that “when we turn to history, it is not to find answers, but to pick up 
the questions bequeathed to us by the dead”.143 Besides, expanding Marx’s 
thought until our days, we cannot but agree that the social revolution of the 21st 
century cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future. Only, in 
our case, poetry from the future cannot be found in the lines of a contemporary 
book with no ending, such as Change the World Without Taking Power, but in 
                                               
141 John Holloway “Drive your cart and plough over the bones of the dead”, in Phil Hearse (ed.), Take the Power to change 
the World,  ibid, pp.67-68 
142 On this, see:  
-D’Amato, ibid. 
-Hilary Wainright, “Response to John Holloway, Change the World by Transforming Power-Including State Power!”,  
(2004), http://archive.iire.org/pamphlet_nsf_2006.pdf 
143 Holloway, ibid., p.72 
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those of another book with no epilogue. I am talking about The State and 
Revolution, which Holloway chooses to treat as inexistent and whose last 
chapter, focused on the experience of the 1905 and 1917 Russian revolutions, 
was never written!  
In the pages of The State and Revolution, the crushing of the old state 
machinery and the construction of a communist society with no classes or state 
are dealt with dialectically, meaning as organically linked aspects of a unified 
and, at the same time, contradictory process, just as Marx approached it in the 
pages of the 18th Brumaire, The Civil War in France and the Critique of the 
Gotha Programme. However, it has been proven that Holloway’s open Marxism 
has no room for such a dialectical approach. It seems easier to this movement-
oriented version of the postmodern left to by-pass revolutionary Marxism and 
to confront its Blanquist or Stalinist caricature.  
However, no detour, no skillful formulation can cover up or displace one of 
the most crucial dividing lines for the theory and practice of an international 
communist movement of the 21st century:  
On the one hand, a contemporary Marxist theory, a contemporary 
revolutionary Marxism that attempts a return, with no nostalgia, to the 
uncertain future of the Paris Commune and the October Revolution; on the 
other, re-discovered anarchist-liberal views, such as Holloway's, who, 
using a postmodern methodology and an anti-capitalist rhetoric, focuses 
through his own lens and with over a century's delay, on the "great truth” 
that was once formulated by the patriarch of social-democratic 
reformism, Eduard Bernstein: “the movement is everything, the goal is 
nothing”!  
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